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Uncertainty poses not only threats but also opportunities. This study sought
to build the scientific foundation for introducing a real options (ROs) methodology
for price risk management to the leasing industry. A price risk management that
allows for both coping with threats and taking advantage of opportunities. In the
leasing industry, fixed rate long-term lease contracts help contract parties stabilize
cash flows within volatile markets. The contract’s term, however, may be extended
long enough that prevent capturing the opportunities of gaining greater profits or re-
ducing expenses. Therefore, the flexibility that enables participants to take advantage
of favorable market price is desirable.
This discussion is dedicated to the study of three different forms of price ad-
justments flexibility: 1) single-sided price adjustment flexibility (SSPAF). 2) double-
sided price adjustment flexibility (DSPAF) with the preemptive right to exercise.
3) DSPAF with the non-preemptive right to exercise. Each was designed to meet
various participants flexibility requirements and budgets. An ROs methodology was
developed to model, price, and optimize these flexibility clauses. The proposed ap-
proach was then tested in the example of Time Charter (TC) rate contracts from the
maritime transport industry. Both the metric and the process for quantifying the
benefit of the proposed flexibility clauses are provided.
This work provides an alternative approach to the price risk management,
which is accessible to all participants in the leasing industry. It is also the starting
point in studying the multiple-party, multiple-exercisable price adjustment flexibility.
Moreover, both the flexibility designs and the proposed ROs methodology for price
risk management are applicable to not only other forms of lease contracts but also to
other forms of contract relationships.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND
Uncertainty and ambiguity are key challenges faced by today’s business leaders
and decision makers. Uncertainty is a state of having limited knowledge, lack of cer-
tainty or being not precisely determined about a future outcome. Uncertainty comes
from a great variety of sources including changes in economic and financial policies,
demand and market conditions, and the competitive environment. Uncertainty that
have some possible undesired outcomes inheres risk. The greater the uncertainty the
greater the risk. The recent economic difficulties and global crises have created more
uncertainties and risks, while also increasing the challenges to todays businesses. For
instance, the uncertainty in the spot market price creates market price risk, and re-
quires appropriate management to control or reduce the risk of adverse price changes
in the spot market. Uncertainty, however, encompasses both risks and opportunities.
For example, the market price uncertainty presents risks to sellers as the market price
may decrease. However, the uncertain environment also presents opportunities, such
as the market price increase for sellers. Uncertainty can be managed with flexibility.
Flexibility is the ability to change with relative ease [1].
Increasing competition leads to more stringent business environments. Com-
panies and market participants in highly competitive environments find themselves
under the pressure to respond to ever-faster changes in market conditions. Compa-
nies are forced to look for more flexible tools and forms in their businesses. Flexibility
in economic activities and “tailor-made” relations among business participants are
necessary to correspond to the specific requirements and adjust to changing market
2conditions. Companies also need flexibility to both hedge risks and capture opportu-
nities.
Traditional long-term fixed price agreements historically dominated in the
business environment. Long-term agreements enable economic actors to coordinate
behavior. It also provides participants with a hedge against market price risk. More-
over, in a long-term agreement the seller offers better prices, because seller will have
a long period of stable cash flows and less market price risk. Short-term agree-
ments bringes more cost to all participants including re-negotiation cost. Long-term
agreements, however, come with some shortcomings. Long-term agreements lock
participants in for a the agreement time, and participants are unable to capture op-
portunities when market prices move in their favor. This inefficiency could be of
high price to companies and market participants. For a long time now, companies
have been looking for ways to build flexibilities into their contracts. Participants of
long-term fixed price agreements such as long-term procurement contracts and lease
contracts loaded contracts with different clauses that allows for flexible relationships
between contract participants while also transferring different types of risk between
the concerned parties. Historically, risk sharing has been one of the main factors influ-
encing contract choice. Loading long-term contracts with different types of flexibility
clauses has become an unavoidable trend in today’s competitive business environ-
ment. Examples of important flexibilities embedded in long-term contracts include
the flexibility to renew and to terminate the contract. Such flexibilities create addi-
tional value to contracts and allow contract parties to optimize contracts and allocate
the risks. According to the pricing theory this flexibility should not be provided for
free. Participants are willing to pay for these flexibilities if they were properly priced.
Besides long-term fixed rate agreements, participants in some markets may
use financial derivatives to lock the price at a desired level and, thus, hedge the
price risk. For instance, in the maritime transport industry participants use Freight
3Forward Agreement (FFA) and options on FFAs. However, not all markets have a
relevant derivative market. Even if one is available, not all participants are able to
use derivatives for various reasons. For example, a desired derivative instrument may
not be available when it is needed; not all participants have sufficient knowledge on
derivatives or enough cash reserve to participate in the derivative market.
Participants may still have to enter long-term contracts even when market
conditions are not favorable. In a such case, without the help of financial derivatives,
participants entering long-term contracts could incure considerable losses. Under
such circumstances, the flexibility that allows participants to adjust the lease price is
attractive to some practitioners. For example, a lessor in a lease contract may gain
greater profit if she can either exit the active lease contract or renegotiate the lease
price when the spot price rises dramatically. Such flexibility can also help lessees save
operating costs in case that the spot price decreases dramatically. Consequently, long-
term contracts with the price adjustment flexibility allow the flexibility owner to take
advantage of the favorable movement of market price. The price adjustment flexibility
provides another alternative for managing the price risk, and is more accessible to
participants than financial derivatives. The flexibility become even more valuable in
markets that are not associated with financial derivatives.
Leasing is an important type of long-term agreement. The leasing industry is
very large. Various sorts of assets can be leased, such as cars and trucks, commercial
aircraft and ships, production machinery, industrial equipment (e.g., construction
and medical), plants, offshore drilling and satellites. “Lease” is a term that refers
to several different kinds of contractual relationships between a lessee and a lessor.
Operating leasing separates property ownership from property use where the lessor
receives lease payments and the residual property value and the lessee receives the
use of the property over the lease term [2]. Under operating lease contracts, lessees
4require services that are in short term relative to the life of the asset and may be
repeated many times, possibly at different locations [3].
Lease contract valuation, and valuation in general focus on determining the
price that an investor should pay today in order to obtain the right to receive a
specific set of cash flows through a period of time in the future. Particularly, the
valuation translates a sequence of risky cash flows into a Net Present Value (NPV).
Algebraic models of contract equivalents and Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methods
were traditionally used to value lease contracts. The difficulty in implementing DCF
methods in valuing flexible lease contracts is that the anticipated future cash flows to
be estimated typically do not properly reflect the flexibility that exists in the lease.
In DCF methods the uncertainty is incorporated by discounting risky cash flows
at a higher rate. The used discount rate depends on the risk level. The estimated
discount rate cannot appropriately represent the risk and may lead to significant error
in valuing future cash flows (e.g., [4]). All the above DCF methods are inefficient
methods to model and value the price adjustment flexibility for lease contracts that
are associated with highly volatile cash flows.
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This dissertation work aims at addressing the problem of long-term contract
price inflexibility, which prevents contract parties from taking advantage of favorable
market price movement. Missing this opportunity could deprive the participants of
long-term contracts from a substantial increase in income as the price changes dramat-
ically in participants interest. Missing this opportunity could affect the participants
competitive position.
The general objective of this work is to create the required flexibility for long-
term contractual relationships. A flexibility that enables participants to manage the
5market price risks that arise from the economic uncertainty while simultaneously
enabling the pursuit of opportunities that may arise in the market. Having flexibility
in operations compared to that with no flexibility clearly reduces risk. The hypothesis
for this work is that price adjustment flexibility embedded in long-term lease contracts
would allow the flexibility owner to take advantage of favorable market price changes,
thus complementing the functionality of traditional long-term lease contracts.
This dissertation research has the following three specific objectives:
1. modeling the price adjustment flexibility appropriately to obtain in-depth in-
sights into its role;
2. pricing the price adjustment flexibility precisely and quantifying the return from
investing in it; and
3. providing a user-friendly tool for optimizing the use of price adjustment flexi-
bility for the flexibility owner.
1.3. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Real options (ROs) are a well-recognized method for modeling and pricing
flexibility under highly uncertain conditions (e.g., [5]; [6]; [7] ; [8]). An RO gives the
option holder (decision maker) the right, but not the obligation, to take adaptive
actions when the future condition is changed or to postpone decisions until more in-
formation is available, thereby capturing the essence of flexibility [1]. ROs valuation
has traditionally been applied to valuing business investment decisions under uncer-
tainty by taking into account the managerial flexibility. [9, 10] Applications of ROs
to the investment and operations have been the focus of much academic research [11].
ROs are a well recognized method for modeling and valuing flexibility (e.g., 5, 6, 7, 8).
ROs analysis, in recent years, has gained considerable attention from researchers and
been considered in new areas far beyond valuation of projects. After identifying the
6flexibility and modeling it as an RO, the ROs valuation can be utilized to value the
flexibilities beneficial outcome to identify whether the flexibility is worthwhile.
This dissertation, therefore, is motivated to develop a ROs methodology to
model, price and optimize the price adjustment flexibility for long-term lease con-
tracts.
1.4. CHALLENGES IN THE REAL OPTIONS APPROACH
ROs “translate” the basic pricing theories of financial options into decision
making methods for highly uncertain non-financial domains; therefore, theories, mod-
els, and methods of financial options may not be directly used for ROs. Specifically,
there are three major challenges presenting in this dissertation research: model com-
plexity, computational issue, and exercise strategy specification.
• Model Complexity: Existing models of financial options may not be able to
capture the characteristics of ROs. The context of ROs are often more complex
than that of the financial options. Modification of existing models of financial
options or developing new models is often needed.
• Computational Issue: Estimating one participant’s decision involves estimating
the other participant’s decisions. This interdependence between participants’
decisions escalates the computational complexity. The price adjustment can
be exercised at any time during the contract life. The dynamic nature of the
decision further increases the computational complexity.
• Exercise Strategy Specification: Much of the ROs literature focuses on the ROs
valuation. The way to implement the optimal exercise strategy is often ignored
or simplified. Specifically, the process for developing a tool that optimizes the
use of ROs is often missing.
7Therefore, the development of a ROs methodology for the price risk manage-
ment requires creative efforts of identifying the flexibility or opportunity for uncertain
conditions, building RO models, and probing solution approaches.
1.5. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION RESEARCH
The dissertation is composed of three research essay where the price adjust-
ment flexibility is developed in stages. In the first essay “Valuation of Lease Contracts
with a Price Adjustment Option: An Application to The Maritime Transport Indus-
try”, the single-sided price adjustment flexibility (SSPAF) for the lessor is modeled
as an American call option and that for the lessee is modeled as an American put
option. The effect of two variables of flexibility design are studied, including the
lock-up period that prohibits the price adjustment very early in the contract life and
the time dependent exercise price that diminishes as time passes. The finite differ-
ence method (FDM) is developed for pricing the SSPAF and visualizing the optimal
exercise strategy. This work has built the fundamentals of modeling, pricing and
optimizing the price adjustment flexibility for long-term fixed rate lease contracts.
The second essay “A Real Options Approach to the Modeling and Valuation
of Double-Sided Price Adjustment Flexibility with the Preemptive Right to Exercise”
is the first attempt to introduce double-sided price adjustment flexibility (DSPAF)
to the leasing industry. The DSPAF aims at addressing the dilemma of allowing
only one party to have the price adjustment flexibility while both parties of a lease
contract want it. Yet one party may enjoy superior flexibility over the counterparty
through buying a preemptive right of the flexibility. The essay models the double-
sided flexibility as sequentially compounded ROs and provides both contract party
the optimal exercise strategy. The proposed flexibility is embedded in Time Charter
(TC) contracts from the maritime transport industry to illustrate the effectiveness
8of it in helping manage the price risk of lease contracts. Numerical experiments are
analyzed to determine the best tradeoff between computational complexity and result
accuracy.
The third essay “A Real Options Approach to the Modeling and Valuation
of Double-Sided Price Adjustment Flexibility with the Non-preemptive Right to Ex-
ercise” is dedicated to the study of the non-preemptive right to exercise the price
adjustment. The non-preemptive right is defined as an equal, parallel right for both
contract parties to adjust the lease price. The DSPAF with the non-preemptive right
is expected to meet the flexibility requirements in more cooperative relationships, in
situations where both parties have concerns with the random movement of future
price yet are unable to predict its trend, and in cases where both contract parties
agree on sharing the price adjustment flexibility at the same level. This work provides
the mathematical insight into the complexity in modeling and valuation.
The three developed forms of price adjustment flexibility are valuable options
for negotiating flexibility clauses for long-term lease contracts. These are designed
to meet different participants’ price risk management requirements. The suitabil-
ity depends on the participants’ expectation on the market prices, the goal off risk
management, the participants’ budget for the risk management purpose, and their
attitude towards cooperation.
1.6. ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTION
Expected contributions of this dissertation research are four-fold:
• The dissertation provides an alternative risk management tool that is more
accessible to all participants in the leasing industry than financial derivatives.
• It provides a variety of price adjustment flexibility clauses to meet different
needs for the flexibility and budget constraints.
9• It builds the scientific foundation for studying the multiple-sided, multiple-
exercisable price adjustment flexibility (MMPAF) for general contract relation-
ships.
• It contributes to the literature on ROs by pushing the boundaries of RO appli-
cations.
10
2. VALUATION OF LEASE CONTRACTS WITH A PRICE
ADJUSTMENT OPTION: AN APPLICATION TO THE
MARITIME TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Leasing an asset corresponds to purchasing the use of the asset over a fixed
period of time. The term “lease” is a generic term that refers to different kinds of
contractual relationships between a lessee and a lessor. Lessees under lease contracts
require services that are in short term relative to the asset life and may be repeated
multiple times, possibly at different locations [3]. The leasing industry is very wide
and leasing is an attractive option for many businesses and services that involve
capital-intensive assets performing specific functions. Examples of important leas-
ing markets include the real estate market, shipping chartering market, and vehicle
leasing market. Each lease market has specific features and dynamics. This essay is
presented in the context of maritime transport.
The primary task of the international maritime transport industry is to pro-
vide the service of delivering certain cargo from one port to another. The freight rate
is the price of shipping service. The service is provided under specific contractual
agreements which are the shipping freight contracts. Freight markets in the inter-
national bulk shipping industry include the spot market for single voyages and the
auxiliary market for period time charters [12].
Freight rates volatility denotes the variability or the dispersion of the freight
rates. Volatility is a well-known characteristic of freight markets. Ocean freight rates
may change substantially over a short time span. The volatility has not dampened
over the years. Since year 2000 ship owners and cargo owners have faced both very
high and rather low freight rates [13]. The volatility in freight markets may come
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from seasonal, cyclical reasons or random shocks [14]. The larger the volatility, the
greater chance by which freight rates may deviate from the expectation [15].
The basic theoretical concept in the maritime economic literature states that
the shipping price in a competitive freight market is determined by the demand and
supply relationship (see, for example, [16].However, the volatility of freight rates
observed constitutes a major source of market risk for ship owners, charterers, and
other parties involved in the maritime transport industry including shipping hedge
funds and shipping banks. For a commodity or energy producer (e.g., a refiner)
hiring in vessels, high freight rates increase the production cost and, thus, affect the
product price or the production profit. For a ship owner, low freight rates yield
less income from hiring out vessels [17, 18]. The combination of huge investments
and high uncertainty in freight rates creates a substantial demand for hedging and
management of freight rate risk.
Revenues of maritime transport industry followed the booming world trade
fairly closely until mid-2008, with the Clarksea index of freight rates reaching a peak
of 47,567 at the end of year 2007 (The Clarksea index is a weighted average index
of freight earnings for the three major vessel types: bulker, tanker, and container
vessels). However, as the global financial crisis spread and deepened in 2008, the
index dropped almost 85%, from its peak to a low of 8,025 in April 2009. Extreme
changes in revenues, operating cash flows, and asset values during the recent financial
crisis have upset the usual means of financing shipping companies. Risk management
has become a critical task for shipping companies in this new environment [19].
The objective of hedging is to control or reduce the risk of adverse price
changes in the spot market [20]. One available tool of hedging freight rate risk
is freight derivatives, including Freight Forward Agreement (FFA) and options on
FFAs. However, the use of FFAs is not always coming flawless. The effectiveness of
FFAs hedge depends on the liquidity of specific routes and the accuracy of forward
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assessments. The use of freight derivatives requires qualified and well-educated per-
sonnel who are familiar with the derivative market. Besides, a large amount of cash
should be sufficiently reserved in case of loss in the FFA market. Freight derivatives
have become a strong interest of sophisticated investors who are not active in physi-
cal shipping markets [19]. However, the use of freight derivatives by ship owners and
charterers is limited according to different surveys (see, for example, 21, 22, 23).
The freight rate risk has traditionally been managed by Time Charter (TC)
contracts [24]. TC contracts reduce the exposure to the spot freight market during
the entire life of the contract. Furthermore, it is well known that industrial charterers
use TC contracts to meet most of their long-term transportation requirements and
use spot contracts for extra needs, which might be seasonal or cyclical [25]. The TC
rate is less volatile than the spot rate as the latter is more exposed to the day-to-
day market condition than the former. Under a TC contract, the charterer hires in
a vessel for a specified time period at a pre-determined rate (i.e. a TC rate) and
locks in the future rate, accordingly. The hire period ranges from several weeks to
15 years, during which the charterer has the operational control of the ship and the
ship owner receives fixed income from hiring out the ship. The TC market tends to
be peripheral to the spot freight market; it also share many similarities with futures
markets in that the TC rate reflects the expectation of future spot rate [26].
TC contracts, however, present certain limitations. A TC contract commits
the two parties of the contract to a fixed rate for the contract term. The committed
TC rate after some time could be far from the prevailing TC rate as the spot market
moves up or down, squeezing one party of the contract in an unfavorable contractual
situation. Consider a ship owner hiring out a vessel for a period of time under certain
TC contract rate. If the freight rate in the spot market rises while the ship owner
is still paid at the low TC rate, she losses the opportunity of gaining greater income
if the ship were working in the spot market or hired out at the higher current TC
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rate. Similarly, if the spot rate goes down, the charterer, under the TC contract,
pays more than she would if she were working in the spot market or at a more
recent TC rate. [27, 28]. [29] argued that a major contention of lease contracts in
the maritime transport market is the penalty for pre-terminating the lease or higher
price potentially paid by the lessee.
In practice, as an attempt to resolve the above-mentioned problem, a clause
may be included in a TC contract, which gives one party the right to extend the TC
contract term or the right to renegotiate the TC rate. In some cases one party of a
shipping contract, in order to get out of unfavorable situations, would put pressure on
the other party to change the contract rate although a relevant clause is not included
in the original contract. These extension and renegotiation flexibilities if included
in the contract are practically given for free, without a fair compensation to the
flexibility maker. Consequently, this could let one party benefit from the clause while
hurts the other party. If these flexibilities were included in a TC contract at certain
costs, an appropriate valuation of the flexibilities is an issue for the party paying for
these flexibilities. The limitation of TC contracts critically affects the viability of
TC contracts as a risk management tool and explains why many charterers and ship
owners avoid entering TC contracts for extended periods. This necessitates the needs
for quantifying the benefits of rate adjustment flexibility and determining the best
way to use it.
It is well known that real options can be best used to build flexibility ar-
rangement into systems under uncertain environments. The concept of real options
is originated from financial options. A real option gives the option holder a right,
yet not an obligation, to undertake an action in the future at a predetermined price,
which is termed the “exercise price” (e.g. 9, 10). The highly volatile environment
of maritime transport industry is a suitable context for real options applications.
Moreover, real options share similarities with the flexibility in TC rate adjustment in
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volatile freight markets. Therefore, the author is motivated to model the flexibility
in TC rate adjustment as a real option embedded in the TC contract system. Real
options valuation is used to help determine the fair price of the flexibility and provide
the best strategy of utilizing the flexibility.
The proposed approach improves the hedging effectiveness of traditional TC
contracts in an unprecedented manner. It is not envisioned to let TC contracts
substitute other risk management tools such as freight derivatives. Instead, it is
proposed as another alternative tool that practitioners can directly use and customize
for various conditions.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. The following section summarizes
the relevant literature. Then, TC contracts with a flexibility to adjust the contract
rate are modeled and valued, followed by numerical examples and result analysis.
Findings from this research and potential future research are summarized at the end.
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The breadth of relevant literature for the current problem includes theoretical
studies on the freight rate dynamics and the applications of real options valuation to
the shipping industry, which are summarized as follows.
2.2.1. Models of Freight Rates Dynamics. Modeling the dynamics of
spot freight rate is the basic building block of any pricing applications in shipping
economics. Starting with [30], the functioning of freight markets and modeling of
spot freight rate for bulk shipping have been the topic of much research in maritime
economics [31]. The classical research in maritime economics attempts to model the
spot rate in a structural model setting (e.g., 16, 30, 32) where the rate is determined by
the demand-supply equilibrium. However, recent research, inspired by advancements
in financial economics, suggests the use of some well-known stochastic models. Major
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models of freight rate processes used in the literature are briefly summarized as
follows.
In early stages, [33], [34], and [9] suggested that the spot freight rate follows
a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) process. However, [35] argued that there is
no evidence supporting the use of GBM model for freight rates. [36] proposed to
model the spot freight rate as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) mean reverting process,
identical to the famous interest rate dynamic process in [37]. This process has been
widely used in the commodity market [38]. In the shipping freight literature, the OU
model has been applied and/or supported by many studies including [33], [36], [39],
[40], [41], [42], [43], and [44]. [35] used a different form of mean reverting process
named Geometric Mean Reversion process (GMR). [39] used a Mean Reversion with
Absorption level (MRA) process to model the freight rate dynamics.
Lately, new trends of freight rate modeling are emerging. For example, non-
parametric specification models that take account of non-linearity in freight rates
[42, 45], and the model of spot freight rate in a stochastic partial equilibrium frame-
work [31]. Moreover, there exist a substantive number of other useful models capable
of formulating the volatility and variance of time series data, such as the Autore-
gressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH), Generalized ARCH (GARCH), and
Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) (e.g., 18, 46, 47). Empirical research into freight
rate dynamics, however, has found strong evidence to support mean reverting process
models [44].
2.2.2. Real Options Valuation in Shipping. In the shipping literature,
the applications of real options to the investment and operations have been the focus
of much academic research [11]. For instance, [35] valued Very Large Crude Carrier
(VLCC) and focused on lay-up and scrapping problems using two alternative spot
freight rate processes; [48] developed a real options valuation model to value the
flexibility in switching between wet and dry bulk shipping markets; [49] built an
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entry-exit model for the switchover between dry bulk and tanker markets (see [50]
for more examples); and [51] and [52] analyzed strategies for managing general lease
contracts with purchase and exit options. [53] discussed real options applications to
logistics and transportation; and [54] valued a truck transportation option. These
two studies are also relevant to the research of this essay.
Although there exist a considerable number of studies applying real options to
the shipping investment and operations, applications of real options to the design and
management of shipping contracts are very limited. [36] is a pioneer in applying real
options to the valuation of TC contracts. The authors modeled the freight rate as a
mean reverting process and valued a European option to extend a TC contract with
contingent claim analysis. In a more advanced work, [43] proposed a valuation method
for TC contracts with built-in Bermudan purchase options on chartered ships and
developed a new two-factor stochastic model. [44] analyzed and priced TC contracts
with extension and purchase options. They formulated the stochastic spot freight
rate as the single-factor model presented in [36].
The literature review reveals that real option applications to TC contracts
were mainly focused on the valuation of TC contracts with an option to purchase the
ship or to extend the contract term. To the best of our knowledge there has been
no research that attempted to solve the genuine problem of TC contracts, that is
the risk associated with the long term commitment to a fixed rate in very volatile
shipping markets.
2.3. THE MODEL
This essay assumes that the spot rate market is arbitrage-free and the term
structure of interest rate is flat. The model of real options valuation is built on the
17
general option pricing theory. Major symbols used in the modeling are listed in the
Nomenclature in Appendices.
2.3.1. Valuation of Time Charter Contracts. For simplicity and tractabil-
ity this research has chosen to adopt the one-factor model in [36], which assumes the
spot freight rate follows an OU process. The model is commonly used in the literature
and receives support from empirical studies. The dynamics of the spot freight rate,
X(t), is modeled by the following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dX(t) = k(α−X(t))dt+ σdZ(t), (2.1)
Where k is the reverting speed, α is the constant long term rate, σ is the instan-
taneous volatility of the spot freight rate, and Z(t) is a one-dimensional standard
Wiener process. Given a time series data of X(t), the model parameters can be fit-
ted through, for example, the regression analysis in the Appendices. The stochastic
process followed by the spot freight rate is transformed from the actual probability
measure to an equivalent Martingale measure (∗), becoming
dX(t) = k(α∗ −X(t))dt+ σdZ(t)∗, (2.2)
where Z∗ is the standard Wiener process under the equivalent Martingale measure
and the long term rate under the Martingale measure, α∗, is given by
α∗ = α− σλ
k
. (2.3)
λ in Eqn. (2.3) is the market price of risk. A method of estimating λ has been
discussed in [55] and applied by [56]. The instantaneous cash flow generated by a
ship can be calculated as
D(t)dt = (aX(t)− b)dt, (2.4)
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where a is the size of the cargo, which is equal to one whenever the freight rate is
quoted for the whole ship. b is the total cost flow rate. The spot freight rate in
this section is modeled as the Time Charter Equivalent (TCE) spot rate (dollar/day)
rather than the spot freight rate (Worldscale or dollar/ton) itself. The TCE rate is
the income of a ship on a daily basis less voyage related costs with bunkers, harbor
and channel charges deducted from the transport income [57]. Since the TCE spot
rate already includes voyage expenses, b only accounts for operating expenses and
capital costs. b is considered as a constant in this section because operating expenses
and capital costs are fairly stable in the maritime transport industry [44].
The risk-neutral expected value of the continuous cash flows from a spot rate






= aA(T − t, r + k)X(t)−B(T − t, r, k), (2.5)
where A is the annuity value factor defined as
A(t, r) = [1− exp (−rt)] /r, (2.6)
and the term B is calculated as
B(t, r, k) = aα∗A(t, r + k)− (aα∗ − b)A(t, r). (2.7)
r in Eqns. (2.5,2.7) is the risk-free interest rate, assumed constant.
Now consider a TC contract written at time t, where the charterer has the
right to operate the ship from time t through T . The charterer pays a fixed rate,




e−rsF (t, T )ds
]
= F (X(t), t)A(T − t, r). (2.8)
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According to the non-arbitrage assumption, the value of the TC contract is equal to
that of the spot rate contract within the same time frame. Therefore, the TC rate,
F (X(t), t), is
F (t, T ) =
1
A(T − t, r) [aA(T − t, r + k)X(t)−B(T − t, r, k)] . (2.9)
As the TC contract is originally written at time 0, the initial TC rate, F (X(0), 0), is
F (0, T ) =
1
A(T, r)
[aA(T, r + k)X(0)−B(T, r, k)] . (2.10)
Equation (2.9) shows that F (X(t), t) is positively correlated to X(t), meaning that
an increase of the spot freight rate would lead to an increase of the TC rate and vice
versa. The essay exploits this feature to design and value the suggested real options.
2.3.2. Design of TC Contracts With Rate Adjustment Flexibility.
This essay models a TC contract that allows the ship owner or the charterer to adjust
the TC rate for once during the contract life. The new rate is the prevailing TC rate
at the time of rate adjustment, which would be applied to the remaining life of the
contract. The major design variables for TC contracts with rate adjustment flexibility
are the following:
• A lock-up period, starting at time zero and ending at tL, during which the
original freight rate is not adjustable.
• A predetermined cost, K, that the option holder pays at the the time of ad-
justing the contracted TC rate to the prevailing TC rate.
A TC contract with such a structure provides the rate adjustment flexibility at a
reasonable cost (i.e., buying an insurance on the risks she has concerns) and mimics
the actual practice in shipping contracts. The choice of these two design variables
impacts the option price (i.e., the premium of the insurance).
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The TC contract structure is further illustrated in Fig. 2.1. The lock-up
period starts at time zero and ends at time tL (tL < T ). A reasonable lock-up period
may help reduce the cost of flexibility without giving up major benefits of flexibility.
This is because the evolution of spot rate takes time and, therefore, the chance of
using the flexibility early in the contract life is relatively small. The longer the lock-
up period, the lower the flexibility and option price. The adjustment cost, K, can
be used to control the difficulty in option exercise, so the option price. We choose
K to be equal to a constant percentage of the remaining cash flows of the original
contract:
K(t) = hA(T − t, r)F (X(0), 0), (2.11)
where h (h ≥ 0) is the proportional factor for determining the adjustment cost.
Equation (2.11) indicates that the option holder will pay a higher adjustment cost
early in the contract life because the price adjustment impacts a large portion of cash
flows of the original TC contract. With time elapses, less cash flows are affected by
the price adjustment; therefore, the option holder will pay a lower adjustment cost
if she exercises the option late in the contract life. Moreover, the formula of K(t)
in Eqn. (2.11) indicates that the time value of money is taken care of too when
determining the adjustment cost . We further explain practical aspects of call and
put options as follows.
In oreder to illustrates the call option modeling. Consider a ship owner who
enters a TC contract at a certain rate, F (X(0), 0), and yet has concerns with the
increase in freight rates in the future. The ship owner does not like to be locked in a
TC contract that may produce a significantly lower income than that she would get
if she were working in the spot market or entering a more recent TC contract. Ship
owner can request to embed a call option to the TC contract that gives her the right
but not the obligation to adjust the freight rate for once at any time t (tL < t ≤ T )
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Figure 2.1: Contract structure
to the prevailing TC rate, F (X(t), t), at the predetermined adjustment cost, K(t).
This case is analogous to buying back the original freight service from the charterer
(i.e., terminating the contract) and then selling a new service at the prevailing price
(i.e., entering a new contract). This option also shares similarity with the financial
exchange option with floating exercise price. The intrinsic value of exercising the
option at time t is A(T − t, r)[F (X(t), t)− (1 + h)F (X(0), 0)]. The exercise decision
is an optimal stopping time problem where the option holder will continually compare
the TC rate she is already receiving to the prevailing TC rate to determine the best
time to adjust the TC rate (i.e., exercise the call option). Like in any American
option valuation, the optimal exercise decision at any point of time is determined
by the maximum between the intrinsic value of immediate exercise and the expected
continuation value (i.e., the value of the risk-free portfolio that contains the option
and the underlying asset). Therefore, the value of the American call option embedded
in this TC contract, C(X(t), t), satisfies
C(X(t), t) ≥ A(T − t, r) max{F (X(t), t)− (1 + h)F (X(0), 0), 0}, (2.12)
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where the prevailing TC rate for the remaining life of the contract, F (X(t), t), is a
function of the spot rate, X(t), and time, t, which is defined in Eqn. (2.9). The
adjustment cost factor, h, effectively controls the exercise price of the call option.
The greater the adjustment factor, the more difficult the option exercise and the
lower the option price.
In oreder to illustrates the put option modeling. Consider a charterer who has
concerns with over-payment of freight cost if the freight rate decreases in the future.
Charterer can request to embed a put option to the TC contact, which gives her the
right to adjust the TC rate for once at any time t (tL < t ≤ T ) to the prevailing TC
rate, F (X(t), t), at the predetermined adjustment cost, K. This case is analogous
to selling the original freight service back to the ship owner (i.e, terminating the
contract) and then buying a new service from the ship owner at the prevailing price
(i.e., entering a new contract). The intrinsic value of exercising the put option at
time t is A(T − t, r)[(1 − h)F (X(0), 0) − F (X(t), t)]. The value of the put option,
P (X(t), t), satisfies
P (X(t), t) ≥ A(T − t, r) max{(1− h)F (X(0), 0)− F (X(t), t), 0}. (2.13)
The adjustment cost factor, h, effectively controls the exercise price of the put option.
The greater the adjustment factor, the more difficult the option exercise and the lower
the option price.
2.3.3. The Options Valuation. The inequality for valuing the options is











− rV ≤ 0, (2.14)
where V , V (X(t), t) is the contingent claim value, that is, C(X(t), t) defined in
Eqn. (2.12) or P (X(t), t) in Eqn. (2.13). If the option exercise is optimal at time t,
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V (X(t), t) is equal to the intrinsic value of exercising the option and the inequality is
strict. Otherwise, V (X(t), t) is greater than the intrinsic value of option exercise and
the inequality is an equality. The option value at maturity is equal to zero because
the value of TC contract diminishes over and, finally, reduces to zero at the end of
the contract term,
V (X(T ), T ) = 0. (2.15)
While there is no closed form solution to the above derived inequality (very few
optimal stopping problems allow for the derivation of closed form solutions), it is
solved numerically. This section uses the finite difference method (FDM) where a
numerical solution to the the partial differential equation (PDE) in (2.14) can be
found by converting the PDE to a set of finite difference equations [58].
Numerical procedures of the FDM are discussed below and the pseudo code
in Appendices further delineates the procedures. The FDM starts with building a
two-dimensional (2D) grid for approximating the spaces of spot rate, X(t), and time,
t. The grid is determined by choosing proper values for the minimum value of X(t),
Xmin, the maximum value of X(t), Xmax, the step size of X(t), ∆X, and the step
size of time t, ∆t. M denotes the number of steps on the dimension of X(t) and it is
equal to (Xmax −Xmin)/∆X; therefore, X(t) on the grid is approximated by
Xj = Xmin + j∆X, for j = 0, 1, . . . ,M. (2.16)
N is the number of steps on the dimension of t, and it is equal to T/∆t. t on the
grid is approximated by
ti = i∆t, for i = 0, 1, . . . , N. (2.17)
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t, X(t) and V (X(t), t) in the PDE of (2.14) are replaced by ti, Xj and Vi,j, respectively.
Then, the portfolio value, Vi,j, is determined backwards (i.e., i = N−1, N−2, . . . , 0).
Boundary conditions, which need to be first determined at each time step, require
special attention. The section has adopted the method introduced by [59] and im-
plemented by [44] in order to overcome the problem of PDE being “convection dom-
inated” for mean reverting processes. The method uses an explicit approximation
for the option value at the boundaries of X(t) instead of directly defining it. On the
lower boundary of X(t) (i.e., when j = 0), the portfolio value, Vi,0, is determined by
Vi,0 = γ0,0Vi+1,0 + γ0,1Vi+1,1 + γ0,2Vi+1,2, (2.18)
where




























On the upper boundary of X(t) (i.e., when j = M), the portfolio value, Vi,M , is
determined by































For interior points of the grid (i.e., j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1), an implicit method
is used to determine Vi,j, which involves solving a system of linear equations:



























If ti is greater than tL, Vij obtained from Eqns. (2.18), (2.20), and (2.22) is
compared to the intrinsic value of option, Gi,j, to examine the optimality of immediate
exercise. Finally, the option price is obtained, equal to V0,j˜ where j˜ is the index of
X(0) (i.e., j˜ = (X(0)−Xmin)/∆X).
2.4. RESULT ANALYSIS
This section presents numerical examples for analyzing the rate adjustment
flexibility for TC contracts, the design of flexibility, and the value the flexibility adds
to TC contracts. In all the examples, the market price of risk, λ, is assumed zero.
The assumption is supported by the work of [56] who found that the market price
of risk is close to zero for most levels of freight rate, indicating that ship owners are
not compensated for the risk associated with trading in the spot market. A risk free
interest rate of 5% per year is used for discounting future cash flows (converted to
5
360
% per day in the valuation). For simplicity, the freight rate is quoted for the whole
ship (i.e., a = 1) and net of all costs (i.e., b = 0) such that X(t) is the instantaneous
net cash flow from an operating vessel. In the FDM, the 2D grid is built by choosing
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Xmax = 130 × 103 dollar/day, Xmin = −60 × 103 dollar/day, ∆X = 500 dollar/day,
and ∆t = 30 days.
2.4.1. Benchmark Case. A benchmark case is first defined, where the TC
contract includes an embedded American option to adjust the contracted TC rate
to the prevailing TC rate for once at any time during the contract life (i.e., tL = 0)
with no adjustment cost (i.e., h = 0). The term of contract, T , is equal to five years
(converted to 5×360 days in the valuation) in the benchmark case. The long term
rate under the equivalent Martingale measure, α∗, is 40× 103 dollar/day. Volatility,
σ, is 3 × 103 dollar/day3/2. The reverting speed, k, is 1 per year (converted to 1
360
per day in the valuation).
Figure 2.2 illustrates results from the benchmark case. The plot on the upper
left of the figure displays the call option value, C(X(t), t). The initial spot rate,
X(0), is equal to 20×103 dollar/day, and the original TC rate, F (X(0), 0), is equal to
35.717×103 dollar/day. Accordingly, the value of the 5-year TC contract without the
rate adjustment flexibility is $56.884× 106. The price of this call option, C(X(0), 0),
which measures the expected value that the rate adjustment flexibility adds to the
TC contract, is found to be $13.810× 106. That is, the flexibility is expected to add
24.28% of total value to the TC contract in the benchmark case. The plot on the
upper right of Fig. 2.2 illustrates the free boundary of option exercise along with a
random sample path of spot rate. The first time the sample path crosses the free
boundary is 2.62 years. The ship owner (who is also the owner of the call option)
exercises the option at that time and receives the prevailing TC rate, F (2.62, 5), equal
to 55.372× 103 dollar/day for the remaining life of the contract.
Similarly, the plot on the bottom left of Fig. 2.2 displays the put option
value, P (X(t), t). The original TC rate, X(0), is equal to 60 × 103 dollar/day, and
the original TC rate, F (0, 5), is equal to 44.283×103 dollar/day. Therefore, the value
of the TC contract without the rate adjustment flexibility is $70.527×106. The price
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of the put option embedded in the contract is found to be $13.814× 106, indicating
that the flexibility is expected to increase the contract value by 19.59%. The plot on
the bottom right shows the free boundary of this put option and a random sample
path of spot rate. The charterer exercises the option when the sample path crosses
the free boundary the first time, at 2.58 years, and pays the prevailing TC rate,
F (2.58, 5), equal to 25.178× 103 dollar/day for the remaining life of the contract.
Figure 2.2: Option prices and free boundaries in the benchmark case
The sensitivity analysis of the call and put options to the spot rate model
examines the reliability of conclusions from the benchmark case across a broader range
of scenarios. Figures 2.4 and 2.3 illustrate how the option prices and free boundaries
react to changes in model parameters (X(0), k, σ, α∗ and T ). Results of the sensitivity
analysis are also summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in rough approximation in that
the level of impact is indicated by a number of plus and minus signs.
Main observations concluded from the sensitivity analysis are as follows:
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Figure 2.3: Sensitivity of call option price and free boundary to the parameters of
spot rate model in the benchmark case
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Figure 2.4: The sensitivity of put option price and free boundary to the parameters
of spot rate model in the benchmark case
30
Table 2.1: Sensitivity of option prices to the spot rate model
Basic Parameter Call Put





• The increase in the reverting speed, k, has a significant, negative effect on both
the call and put option prices. This is understandable because a high value of
k restricts the variability of the spot rate and thus lowers the price of options.
• The effects of σ and T come next in importance, and both positively impact
the call and put prices. This means the greater the volatility and the longer the
contract life, the higher the option prices. These are typical features of options,
generally.
• X(0) and α∗ have less impacts on option prices. The effect of X(0) is obvious.
The increase in X(0) increases F (X(0), 0), which increases the put option value
and decreases the call option value (see Eqns. (2.12) and (2.13)). The effect of
α∗ is not obvious. The increase in α∗ reduces the negative value of B(t, r, k),
which increases F (X(0), 0) and F (X(t), t) in different ways. In conclusion α∗
has a positive impact on the call option price and yet a negative impact on the
put option price.
Meanwhile, main observations regarding the sensitivity of exercise zone to the
spot rate model in the benchmark case are as follows:
• The increase of σ or T value has a significant, negative impact on the exercise
zone. A larger volatility or a longer maturity is associated with a greater chance
for the freight rate to deviate from the original expectation. Therefore, an
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Table 2.2: Sensitivity of exercise zone to the spot rate model
Basic Parameter Call Put
k + +
σ - - - -
T - - - -
X(0) - +
α∗ - +
increase of σ or T value moves the free boundaries outwards and decreases the
exercise zone.
• X(0) and α∗ work the same way and have less effect on the exercise zone. A
large initial spot rate or long term rate reduces the exercise zone for the call
option and yet increases the exercise zone for the put option. This is due to
the fact that a larger value of X(0) or α∗ makes it easier and more difficult to
exercise the put and call option, respectively.
• the increase of k value expands the exercise zone due to the fact that the
variability of spot rate is reduced by larger k.
2.4.2. Effectiveness of the Option Design for TC Contracts. A differ-
ent case is consider further to examine the effectiveness of the option design for TC
contacts. In this new case, the option holder has the right to adjust the contracted
TC rate to the prevailing TC rate for once after an agreed lock-up period, [0, tL],
at a predetermined adjustment cost, K(t). The option holder pays a premium (i.e.,
the option price) to obtain the rate adjustment flexibility at the beginning of the
contract; option owner will pay the adjustment cost if she exercises the option during
the contract term. Some parties favor a low premium because it is all they would
lose if they do not exercise the option. The lock-up period and adjustment cost can
be tailored to offer desired levels of flexibility and prices.
32
Figure 2.5: Sensitivity of option prices and free boundaries to the adjustment cost, k
Figure 2.6: Sensitivity of option prices and free boundaries to the lock-up period, tL
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Figure 2.5 illustrates the option prices and free boundaries at different levels
of adjustment cost, and Fig. 2.6 illustrates how the option prices and free boundaries
are changed by the lock-up period. Major observations concluded from the sensitivity
analysis are as follows:
• The lock-up period reduces the flexibility simply by prohibiting the option
exercise early in the contract term, whereas the adjustment cost reduces the
flexibility by pushing the free boundaries away from the long term rate (i.e.,
making it more difficult to exercise the options).
• Including a lock-up period and/or an adjustment cost can reduce the option
price to be paid upfront, making the embedded options more attractive to
entities with a limited budget for the adjustment flexibility.
• The adjustment cost is more effective than the lock-up period in adjusting
option prices.
2.4.3. Discounted and Premium TC Contracts. The option price, in-
stead of being paid upfront, can also be in the form of periodic payments equivalent
to a freight rate discount given to a charterer (in case of the call option) or a freight
rate premium paid to a ship owner (in case of the put option). The percentage of
discount or premium also measures the expected contract added value from the rate
adjustment flexibility. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 calculate the percentage of TC rate discount
and the percentage of premium, respectively.
Table 2.3 shows that the maximum expected value that the rate adjustment
flexibility (for the ship owner) can add to the TC contract for is 24.28% (the bench-
mark case). The increases in the lock-up period and the adjustment cost reduce the
flexibility, and the discount percentage. For example, the ship owner, who buys a call
option with a lock-up period of 1.5 years and an adjustment cost equal to 20% of the
value of remaining contract cash flows, will give the charterer a 14.62% discount on
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the regular TC rate throughout the 5-year contract term. If the ship owner feels that
the discount given to the charterer is too large, ship owner may choose to increase the
adjustment cost, for example, to 40% of the value of remaining contract cash flows,
which reduces the discount percentage to 9.56%. Similarly, Table 2.4 indicates the
maximum expected value that the rate adjustment flexibility (for the charterer) can
add to the TC contract is 19.59% (the benchmark case). By increasing the lock-up
period and the adjustment cost, the value added by the flexibility and the premium
paid to the ship owner is reduced. For example, the charterer, who buys a put option
with the same lock-up period (tL = 1.5 years) and adjustment cost (h = 0.2), will pay
the ship owner a 10.96% premium over the regular TC rate throughout the 5-year
contract term. The premium would be reduced to 6.20% if the charterer accepts an
adjustment cost equal to 40% of the value of remaining contract cash flows.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 both confirm that the lock-up period is less capable of
adjusting option price than the adjustment cost would do, particularly when h is
large. For instance, the discount and premium rates are not affected by the change
in lock-up period when h exceeds 0.8. The reason is revealed by looking at Figs. 2.5
and 2.6. The plots on the left of Fig. 2.5 illustrates that the increase in h quickly
eliminates the possibility of exercising the options early in the contract life, which
invalids the adjustment capability of lock-up period illustrated in the left plots of
Fig. 2.6. Therefore, the lock-up period is more effective in controlling option prices
for scenarios of lower adjustment cost.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 provide a convenient tool of contract negotiation to both
the ship owner and charterer in that it facilitates the accomplishment of various levels
of risk management targets and accommodates different budgets for the flexibility.
Moreover, after all terms of the TC contract are negotiated and determined by the
two parties of a TC contract, the corresponding free boundary of option exercise can
be used by the option holder as a tool of contract risk management.
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Table 2.3: The call option price as a TC rate discount (%) to the charterer
tL
h 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 2.0 2.5
0 24.28 24.27 24.11 23.72 23.10 22.30 21.38 19.22 16.77
0.1 19.76 19.76 19.68 19.43 19.02 18.46 17.79 16.17 14.25
0.2 15.90 15.90 15.87 15.73 15.46 15.09 14.62 13.45 12.00
0.3 12.67 12.67 12.65 12.58 12.43 12.20 11.88 11.06 10.00
0.4 10.01 10.01 10.01 09.97 09.89 09.75 09.56 09.01 08.25
0.6 06.08 06.08 06.08 06.08 06.08 06.05 06.01 05.81 05.47
0.8 03.52 03.52 03.52 03.52 03.52 03.52 03.52 03.52 03.48
1.0 02.03 02.03 02.03 02.03 02.03 02.03 02.03 02.03 02.03
Table 2.4: The put option price as a TC rate premium (%) paid to the ship owner
tL
h 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 2.0 2.5
0 19.59 19.58 19.45 19.13 18.63 17.99 17.25 15.51 13.53
0.1 15.15 15.15 15.09 14.92 14.62 14.21 13.70 12.49 11.04
0.2 11.52 11.52 11.50 11.41 11.25 11.01 10.96 09.89 08.87
0.3 08.63 08.63 08.63 08.59 08.51 08.38 08.20 07.70 07.03
0.4 06.40 06.40 06.40 06.39 06.36 06.29 06.20 05.91 05.48
0.6 03.42 03.42 03.42 03.42 03.42 03.42 03.41 03.35 03.21
0.8 01.77 01.77 01.77 01.77 01.77 01.77 01.77 01.77 01.77
1.0 00.91 00.91 00.91 00.91 00.91 00.91 00.91 00.91 00.91
2.4.4. Illustrative Examples. Consider an example in the same setting as
the benchmark case except that it has a lock-up period of 1.5 year and an adjustment
cost equal to 20% of the remaining contracted cash flows. A ship owner, who expects
the TC rate to increase in the future and worries about a possible loss from that price
change, buys the rate adjustment flexibility (i.e., a call option). Consequently, the
ship owner has the right to adjust the original TC rate to the prevailing TC rate for
once any time after the lock-up period at the agreed adjustment cost. The call option
price is $8.318× 106, equivalent to a 14.62% discount of the TC contract rate to the
charterer throughout the 5-year contract life. The free boundary of option exercise
and two random sample paths of spot rate are displayed in Fig. 2.7. The first random
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path of spot rate crosses the free boundary the first time at 1.592 years when the
rate increases to about 99× 103 dollar/day. The option holder (i.e., the ship owner)
exercises the option at that point of time. The option holder, who used to receive
the contracted TC rate equal to 35.717× 103 dollar/day, pays an adjustment cost of
$8.059 × 106 to exercise the option and starts receiving a new TC rate, F (1.592, 5),
equal to 57.419 × 103 dollar/day. The gross gain the option holder receives from
exercising the option and adjusting the freight rate for the remaining contract life is
$15.168 × 106. The option holder makes a net gain (after deducting the call option
price) from the call option, equal to $6.849× 106 (all the gain values are discounted
to time zero at the risk-free rate). In case that the spot rate develops in contrary
to the ship owner’s expectation and never increases high enough to go across the
free boundary during the contract life, just like the second random sample path of
spot rate, the call option will expire and never be exercised. The option holder
then loses the amount of $8.318× 106 she paid for the flexibility of rate adjustment
(or equivalently the 14.62% discount she gave to the charterer). The TC contract,
however, guarantees the ship owner the contracted TC rate regardless of how low the
spot freight rate goes.
Similarly, consider a charterer who enters a similar TC contract when the spot
rate is 60 × 103 dollar/day and expects the TC rate to decrease in the future. The
charterer would like to hedge against the risk of decreasing TC rate; therefore, she
buys the flexibility (i.e., a put option) of adjusting the contracted TC rate to the
prevailing TC rate any time after the lock-up period of 1.5 years at the adjustment
cost equal to 20% of the remaining contract cash flows. Fig. 2.8 illustrates the free
boundary of this put option and two random sample paths of spot rate. In this
example, the put option price is $7.541 × 106, equivalent to paying a premium of
10.96% over the TC rate. The option then is exercised at 2.344 years when the spot
rate of the first random sample drops to −16.500 × 103 dollar/day and crosses the
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Figure 2.7: The free boundary of call option and two random sample paths of spot
rate
free boundary the first time. The freight rate here can be a negative value as it is
represented by instantaneous net cash flow. The negative value implies that the spot
rate drops below costs. The adjustment cost is $7.937 × 106. Upon option exercise,
the TC rate is adjusted from the original TC rate of 44.283 × 103 dollar/day to the
new TC rate of 19.709 × 103 dollar/day. The net gain the put option holder (the
charterer) receives is $4.973× 106. Again, in case that the spot rate never drops low
enough to cross the free boundary of option exercise, just like the second random
sample path, the option holder then loses the amount of $7.541×106 she paid for the
put option. Anyhow, the TC contract guarantees the charterer the contracted TC
rate when the rate is high.
2.5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A fixed rate contact may lock one party of the contract in an unfavorable
condition for a long period of time because the market rate may change dramatically.
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Figure 2.8: The free boundary of put option and two random sample paths of spot
rate
The use of freight derivatives to hedge the freight rate risk requires special knowl-
edge and experiences with derivatives and inherits certain limitations that affect the
hedging effectiveness. This essay exploited an alternative approach - embedding a
flexibility to lease contracts, which allows for adjusting the contracted fixed rate when
it is far away from the prevailing rate. The essay modeled the flexibility as real op-
tions, quantified the price of the flexibility (i.e., the expected value of the flexibility),
and provided a decision management tool. The way of tailoring the flexibility level
and the price of it was also discussed in the contract design.
Contributions of this essay are two-fold. Firstly, the real options model serves
as a tool of lease contract management. The model can be easily set up as a sim-
ple, user friendly tool with GUI (e.g., a web based tool). Ship owners, charterers,
and brokers can directly use the tool for contracting and risk management without
going to the hassle of financial options. The option model and valuation can also
be implemented by any other type of leases if the spot leasing rate follows an OU
process. Secondly, the study presented in this essay enriches real options theories
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and applications. Real options are not about simply applying the financial deriva-
tive theories and methods to non-financial domains. Great efforts of real options lie
in a “domain translation”. This work serves as a good starting point of modeling
flexibilities needed by fixed rate lease contracts in a volatile market environment.
More importantly, this work initiates the discussion of a series of topics that
are interesting to both researchers in the area of real options and contract managers.
For instance, multiple factor models may be implemented to include other risk compo-
nents such as uncertainties in the interest rate (r). Geometric mean reverting (GMR)
process is an alternative model for freight rate dynamics, and the performance of it
is worth of further assessment. One possible extension of current work may involve
in the study of futures options on lease contracts. Other forms of flexibility are more
practical and attractive, which call for further analysis. For instance, while this essay
has revealed that the flexibility in rate adjustment should not be given for free, ship
owners and charterers are still reluctant to pay for the flexibility, particularly in cash.
One possibility is to pay an in-kind adjustment cost, for example, the option holder
when exercising her option provides a rate adjustment option to the other party. A
more attractive practice is to let both parties of a lease contract have equal, parallel
flexibility. The pricing and exercising strategies of these flexibilities are challenging
and subject to further research.
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3. REAL OPTIONS MODELING AND VALUATION OF
DOUBLE-SIDED PRICE ADJUSTMENT FLEXIBILITY WITH
THE PREEMPTIVE RIGHT TO EXERCISE
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The leasing industry is very wide. Various sorts of equipment can be leased,
such as cars and trucks, commercial aircraft and ships, production machinery, indus-
trial equipment (e.g., construction and medical), plants, offshore drilling and satel-
lites. “Lease” is a term referring to several different kinds of contractual relationships
between a lessee and a lessor. Under lease contracts, operators (lessees) require ser-
vices that are in short term relative to the life of the asset and may be repeated
many times, possibly at different locations [3]. Some leasing markets are highly
volatile. The world recent economic crisis created even more sources of uncertainty
for the leasing industry. In today’s uncertain business environment, participants of
the leasing industry show growing interests in flexibilities that can help improve their
competences.
The flexibility in adjusting the lease price complements the risk management
capability of fixed rate contracts. Traditional lease contracts began with a simple
format of contractual relationships between a lessee and a lessor. This simple format
allows the lessor to lock the leasing income over the lease period and the lessee to
fix the operating cost related to the leased equipment during that lease period, thus
reduce price risk. However, uncertainty not only poses risks but also offer opportu-
nities. While fixed rate lease contracts help stabilize cash flows in volatile markets,
lease periods can extend long enough to make the lease contract parties miss oppor-
tunities of gaining greater profits or saving costs. Clearly, flexibility is valuable to
fixed rate contracts. For example, a lessor may gain greater profit if she can either
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exit the active lease contract or renegotiate the lease price when the spot price rises.
Such flexibilities can also help lessees save operating costs in case that the spot price
decreases dramatically.
The flexibility in adjusting the lease price is an alternative tool for managing
the price risk, and it is more accessible to participants than derivatives. Some leas-
ing markets use financial derivatives to lock the lease price at a desired level. For
instance, the maritime transport industry can use Freight Forward Agreement (FFA)
and options on FFAs. However, not all leasing markets have a relevant derivative
market. Even if a derivative market is associated with the leasing market, not all
participants are able to use derivatives for various reasons. For example, a desired
derivative instrument may not be available when it is in need; not all participants
have sufficient knowledge on derivatives or enough cash reserve to participate in the
derivative market. Without the help of derivatives, participants may have to enter
lease contracts when lease market prices are not favorable. For example, lessors usu-
ally hesitate to idle the leasing assets because they need lease incomes to pay down
the bank loan or the capital investment in leased assets. Therefore, they may still
enter a lease contract although the market condition is unfavorable. Under such cir-
cumstances, the flexibility that allows them to adjust the lease price when the market
returns favorable is attractive.
Unsurprisingly, loading lease contracts with flexibility clauses has become an
unavoidable trend in today’s competitive business environment. This essay proposes
to provide both parties of a lease contract the flexibility in adjusting the lease price,
termed the double-sided flexibility. It is an indispensable option for the negotiation
of flexibility clauses because both parties of a lease contract may all want to have the
flexibility under some circumstances. For example, if the lease price at the contract
underwriting can go either way with nontrivial chances, both parties may want to
have the flexibility. The double-sided flexibility can address the dilemma of allowing
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only one party to have the flexibility yet both parties want it. The two parties of a
lease contract may have either different budgets on acquiring the flexibility or different
expectations on the market. This requires offering the flexibility at unequal levels.
The party who wants superior flexibility over the counterparty can purchase the
preemptive right of the flexibility. Preemptive right flexibility defines the relationship
in which a flexibility belongs solely to, and is used by, one party before it is granted
to the other. In contrast, the non-preemptive right defines the relationship as one in
which both parties of a contract have an equal, parallel right in adjusting the lease
price.
Through modeling, pricing and optimizing the double-sided flexibility con-
strained by the preemptive right, this work builds a theoretic foundation for pro-
moting the use of price adjustment flexibility as an alternative tool of price risk
management. This essay models the proposed flexibility as sequentially compounded
real options. The flexibility held by the owner of the preemptive right is defined as
the primary option; that held by the counterparty is defined as the secondary option.
These options allow both parties to take advantage of favorable market price changes
yet at different levels of superiority. Real Options (ROs) are a well recognized method
for modeling and pricing flexibility (e.g., 5, 6, 7, 8). Both the reliability and applica-
bility of the proposed model are tested using Time Charter (TC) contracts, a type of
fixed rate lease agreements commonly used by the maritime transport market where
the price volatility and the peer competition are notable.
The remainder of this essay is organized in the following manner. Section 3.2
summarizes relevant literature to identify the gap existent in current studies. Section
3.3 both models and values the double-sided price adjustment flexibility constrained
by the preemptive right with application to TC contracts. Numerical examples and
result analysis are presented in Section 3.4. Findings from this research and future
research are summarized at the end in Section 3.5.
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3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The valuation of lease contracts with flexibility clauses has been a subject
drawing significant interest in economic circles for many years [60]. Numerous models
proposed in the literature have approached the subject from a variety of perspectives.
The literature relevant to this essay is presented in two streams. The first stream
includes both theoretical and empirical studies on embedding real options in different
lease contracts. The second stream focuses on modeling lease price flexibilities as real
options.
3.2.1. Real Options Embedded in Lease Contracts. Leases, particu-
larly real estate leases, have been examined in different approaches and frameworks
from the perspective of asset users. The seminal work of [61] viewed leasing as pur-
chasing the right to use an asset over a specific period and suggested an equilibrium
model for the valuation of lease contracts. This idea was applied by [62] and [63]. [62]
provided an option-like characterization for leasing and introduced a methodology for
modeling leases in an option approach. Continuing that work, [63] established a no-
arbitrage framework of leasing assets’ pricing. Their framework includes a variety of
lease options, such as a cancellation option and an option to buy the leased asset at
a fixed price or at the market price. [64] theoretically developed leasing flexibility for
real estate leases. Grenadier built a continuous-time model and proposed a unified
option pricing approach that can be used to price a variety of leasing contracts with
different embedded options, such as forward leases, leases with options to either renew
or cancel contracts and lease insurance contracts. [65] derived a model that provides
a unified framework to the equilibrium valuation of leases subject to default risk. [52]
valued complex leasing contracts with a variety of embedded operating options and
discussed the interactions among the combined options. [66] used the same equilib-
rium approach used by [64], however, instead of the monopolistic assumption in a
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game theoretical approach, his work was built on the competitive market assumption.
[67] developed a no-arbitrage based valuation model that calculates the Net Present
Value (NPV) of each lease contract taking into account both the contractual payment
amounts and any embedded options. [68] proposed an endogenous structural model
for the term structure for real estate lease rates. [69] discussed four typical lease
contracts and proposed a decomposition and diagram method. They expressed the
complex real options as a portfolio of both vanilla options and simple exotic options.
Some research with a focus on specific lease markets have been conducted.
[70] developed a game theoretical framework to price lease contracts with options in
imperfect leasing markets for durable goods. [71] priced standard automobile leases
with both cancellation and purchase options. They also discussed the penalty for
early termination of a lease. [72] developed a method for valuing claims on offshore
petroleum lease. [3] valued different options on short-term leases for capital-intensive
equipment. The asset utilization and idle time were key factors in the proposed
methodology. The methodology was illustrated by pricing options for oil-drilling
services.
A significant amount of research has been done on applying ROs to lease
contracts in the maritime transport industry. [36] applied ROs to the valuation of
TC contracts with embedded options. They modeled the spot freight rate as mean
reverting process and used the contingent claim analysis to value a European option
to extend the TC contract. [43] proposed a valuation method for TC contracts with
built-in Bermudan options to purchase chartered ships. [44] analyzed and priced
TC contracts with extension and purchase options. [54] attempted to hedge the
uncertainties in transportation capacity by creating truckload options.
3.2.2. Options to Adjust Leasing Prices. Several studies have specifi-
cally attempted to analyze leasing price flexibilities in the real estate market. The
adjustable-rate lease is one type of researched lease contracts. In an adjustable-rate
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lease the rental rate of real estate is fixed at the lease commencement. The rate can
be either periodically reset to the market rate or adjusted according to some pre-
specified reference index, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or a real estate
index. [73] discussed options embedded in adjustable-rate real estate lease contracts.
These contracts give the lessee a right to either renew the lease or purchase the rental
property at a certain price. The price is tied to the cumulative change in some index,
such as the CPI. [64] also discussed adjustable-rate lease contracts, advocating that
adjustable-rate leasing may provide the lessor with a hedge against both unexpected
inflations and cost fluctuations.
A special form of adjustable-rate leases is the upward-only adjustable leasing,
a common feature of UK commercial leases. [2] presented a stochastic pricing model
of upward-only adjustabal leases. As defined in his study, an upward-only adjustable
lease includes a fixed rental rate for an extended term at the lease commencement.
In addition, however, it gives the lessor the option to periodically adjust the rent to
the market rate (every five years). The lessor will only raise the initial rate to the
prevailing market level if the market rent the increases. The contract rent remains
unchanged, however, if the market rent declines. This upward-only review reduces
both the risk and volatility of cash flows from property investments by setting a
floor for the investment return. [2] indicated that the initial rent for an upward-only
adjustabal lease should be significantly lower than that for a corresponding lease with
both upward and downward rent reviews.
Overage is one universal common feature of retail leases in multi-tenanted
shopping centers. It is one kind of the Percentage Lease Agreements (PLAs), paying
a flat base rent plus a turnover-related income (i.e., the overage). [74] treated the
overage rent as a call option on the tenant’s sale turnover. They applied the binomial
tree model to pricing the option, finding that the option-like feature of the overage
rent adds value to retail leases when the sale volatility is high.
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All the lease price flexibilities found in the literature are single-sided flexibility
that gives only one party (usually the lessor) the right to adjust the price at prede-
termined times, normally every five years with the contract life spanning 15 years or
longer. To the best of our knowledge no previous research attempted to price the
double-sided flexibility.
3.3. THE MODEL
The modeling of a lease contract depends on the type of the contract being
studied, variables underlying the contract, and features of the lease market. This
section illustrates both the modeling and the valuation methods for the TC contract
in the maritime transport industry. The same methodology can be easily modified
and applied to other lease contracts in different lease markets.
3.3.1. Valuation of Operating Lease Contracts. This section models the
spot market rate, X(t), as a mean reverting process, a widely applied model in the
maritime transportation literature (e.g., 36). In a risk-neutral world, the dynamics
of X(t) is defined as
dX(t) = k(α∗ −X(t))dt+ σdZ∗(t), (3.1)
where X(t) is represented by the time charter equivalent (TCE) spot freight rate
[57], k is the reverting speed, α∗ is the long-term steady rate under the risk-neutral
measurement, σ is the instantaneous volatility of the spot rate, and Z∗(t) is the
one-dimensional standard Wiener process under the risk-neutral measurement. The
closed form solution to Eqn.(3.1) is






where  follows a standard normal distribution.
The instantaneous cash flow generated by an operating vessel is
D(t)dt = (aX(t)− b)dt, (3.3)
where a is the size of the cargo (which is equal to 1 when a freight is quoted for the
entire ship) and b denotes the rate of total cost (including both operating costs and
capital expenses).
The value of spot rate contracts during the time period [t, T ] is the risk-neutral






=A(T − t, r + k)aX(t)
+ [A(T − t, r)− A(T − t, r + k)]α∗ − A(T − t, r)b,
(3.4)
where Eˆt is the risk-neutral expected value at time t, r is the risk-free interest rate
(assumed constant), and A is the annuity value factor.
In a TC contract starting at time t and ending at time T , the lessee of the
contract has the right to operate the ship during the time period [t, T ] by paying
continuously at a fixed rate, F (X(t), t). The equivalent value of the total leasing cost






= F (X(t), t)A(T − t, r), (3.5)
According to the non-arbitrage assumption, the value of the TC contract is
equal to that of the spot rate contracts within the same time frame. Therefore, the
TC rate, F (X(t), t), is calculated with
F (X(t), t) = a
A(T − t, r + k)
A(T − t, r) X(t) +
[
1− A(T − t, r + k)
A(T − t, r)
]
α∗ − b. (3.6)
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Eqn. (3.6) determines that the TC rate for the remaining life of the contract,
F (X(t), t), is a function of the spot rate at time t, X(t). This is an important
feature we will exploit to design and value the price adjustment flexibilities.
3.3.2. The Real Options Model of Double-Sided Flexibility. This sec-
tion models the double-sided flexibility in adjusting the contracted TC rate to the
prevailing rate as sequentially compounded real options. The primary option held
by the owner of the preemptive right can be exercised any time during the contract’s
life, whereas the secondary option is not allowed to be exercised until the primary op-
tion has been exercised. Therefore, giving the secondary option to the counterparty
can be seen as paying an in-kind exercise cost (i.e., non-cash cost) for exercising the
primary option. The practicalities of the options are explained below.
The following discusses the DSPAF case when the preemptive right is held by
the lessor. Consider a lessor in a low market negotiating a new T -year lease contract
for the rate F (X(0), 0). The lessor expects the market rate to go up in the future
during the contract term and is concerned over being locked in an underpaid lease.
She wants to hedge against this price risk and, thus, asks to load the lease contract
with a preemptive right to adjust the contracted TC rate once during the contract
term. This preemptive right is equivalent to an American call option that gives her
the right, but not the obligation, to exchange the original TC rate, F (X(0), 0), for
the prevailing rate, F (X(t), t), at any time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). The exercise cost of this
primary call is the right granted to the lessee to re-adjust the TC rate once during the
remaining life of the contract. The right of the lessee is equivalent to an American
put option. The value of the primary call option at any time t is designated by
V PC(X(t), t), while V SP (X(τ), τ) designates the value of the secondary put option
at any time τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ).
The primary option generates value if the spot rate, X(t), rises high enough.
Specifically, the lessor may consider exercising the call option at time t if it has not
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been exercised prior to t and the payoff from exercising the primary call option at t,
A(T − t, r)[F (X(t), t) − F (X(0), 0)], is higher than the value of the secondary put
option at that time, V SP (X(t), t). The intrinsic value from exercising the primary
call at time t, GPC(X(t), t), is defined as
GPC(X(t), t) = A(T − t, r)[F (X(t), t)− F (X(0), 0)]− V SP (X(t), t). (3.7)
Moreover, because the primary call option can be exercised at any time during the
contract’s life, the value of it must satisfy
V PC(X(t), t) ≥ max{GPC(X(t), t), 0}, (3.8)
at any time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). Since the secondary put is also an American option, its
value must satisfy the following inequality during the remaining life of the contract
(i.e., t ≤ τ ≤ T ):
V SP (X(τ), τ) ≥ max{GSP (X(τ), τ), 0} (3.9)
where GSP (X(τ), τ) is the intrinsic value of exercising the secondary put option at
any time τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ),
GSP (X(τ), τ) = A(T − τ, r)[F (X(t), t)− F (X(τ), τ)]. (3.10)
Unlike the primary call (which has an in-kind exercise price), the secondary put option
is assumed to have a zero exercise price, thus simplifying contract management. The
secondary put option is valued only if the spot rate first rises high enough to make
the secondary put option come into being and then falls to a low level to make the
exercise of the secondary put option valuable.
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The following discusses the DSPAF case when the preemptive right is held by
the lessee. A lessee who expects the market rate to go down and wants to protect
against overpaying for the lease would buy a preemptive right to adjust the contracted
TC rate F (X(0), 0). The lessee gets the right to adjust the contract rate at any
time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) to the prevailing rate F (X(t), t) once. This flexibility with the
preemptive right is a primary put option for her, and its value at time t is denoted by
V PP (X(t), t). The exercise cost of the primary put is a right allowing the lessor to
re-adjust the TC rate once during the remaining life of the contract. The right of the
lessor is the secondary call option, and the value of it is designated by V SC(X(τ), τ)
(t ≤ τ ≤ T ). If the primary put option was not exercised prior to time t, the intrinsic
value of exercising it at time t is
GPP (X(t), t) = A(T − t, r)[F (X(0), 0)− F (X(t), t)]− V SC(X(t), t). (3.11)
Because the value of the primary put option can be exercised at any time, the value
of it must satisfy
V PP (X(t), t) ≥ max{GPP (X(t), t), 0}, (3.12)
at any time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). The secondary call option must satisfy the following
inequality during the remaining life of the contract (i.e., t ≤ τ ≤ T ),
V SC(X(τ), τ) ≥ max{GSC(X(τ), τ), 0} (3.13)
where GSC(X(τ), τ) is the intrinsic value of exercising the secondary call option at
time τ ,
GSC(X(τ), τ) = A(T − τ, r)[F (X(τ), τ)− F (X(t), t)]. (3.14)
Again, the secondary call option has zero exercise cost.
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3.3.3. Valuation of Options. The general inequality for valuing the options











− rV ≤ 0, (3.15)
where V , V (X(s), s) is the contingent claim value of any of the options in Eqns.
(3.8), (3.9),(3.12), and(3.13) (i.e., V can be V PC , V SP , V PP , or V SC). Accordingly,
s is used to designate either the time variable in valuing the exercise of a primary
option, t, or the time variable in valuing the corresponding secondary option, τ .
When exercise is optimal, V (X(s), s) is equal to the intrinsic value of exercising the
option, G(X(s), s), and the inequality in (3.15) is strict. Otherwise, V (X(s), s) is
greater than G(X(s), s) and the inequality becomes an equality.
The derived inequality in (3.15) was solved numerically. This section applies
the Finite Difference Method (FDM) to find the solution. With this method the
solution can be found by converting the partial differential equation (PDF) in (3.15)
to a set of finite difference equations [58].
The FDM procedures begin with building a two-dimensional grid on the spaces
of both the spot rate, X(s), and the time, s. This grid is built by appropriately
choosing a range of the spot rate, [Xmin, Xmax], the step of spot rate, ∆X, and
the step of time, ∆s. X(s) is approximated on the grid as Xj = Xmin + j∆X for
j = 0, 1, . . . ,M , where M is equal to (Xmax−Xmin)/∆X. t on the grid is represented
by ti = i∆s for i = 0, 1, . . . , N , where N = T/∆s. τ on the grid is τi′ = i
′∆s for
i′ = i, . . . , N . To derive the finite difference equations for determining the option
value on the grid, si in this section is used to designate both ti and τi′ . We also
replace s, X(s) and V (X(s), s) with si, Xj and Vi,j in (3.15), respectively. The
option value at maturity, VN,j, is equal to zero because the contract value is reduced
to zero at the end of the contract term. The portfolio value determined by the PDE,
52
Vi,j, is then found on the grid backwards (i.e., i = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0). Boundary
conditions must first be determined at each time step. This section has adopted an
improved FDM introduced by [59] and implemented by [44] to overcome the problem
of the PDE being convection-dominated for mean reverting processes. This method
uses an explicit approximation for the option value on the boundaries of Xj instead
of directly defining it. On the lower boundary of Xj (i.e., j = 0), the portfolio value,
Vi,0, is determined by
Vi,0 = γ0,0Vi+1,0 + γ0,1Vi+1,1 + γ0,2Vi+1,2, (3.16)
where




























On the upper boundary of Xj (i.e., j = M), the portfolio value, Vi,M , is determined
by






























An implicit FDM is used to determine the option value at interior points of the grid
(i.e., j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1). This method involves solving a system of linear equations:




























Vi,j obtained from Eqns.(3.16), (3.18), and (3.20) is compared to the intrinsic
value of the option exercise, Gi,j, to examine the optimality of immediate exercise.
The option value is determined, accordingly, by
Vi,j = max{Vi,j, Gi,j}. (3.22)
Thus, the option price is finally obtained. For a primary option, the option price is
equal to V0,j′ , where j
′ is the index of X(0) (i.e., j′ = (X(0) − Xmin)/∆X). For a
secondary option, the option price at any time t is equal to Vi,j˜′ where i = t∆s is the
index of time t and j˜′ = (X(t)−Xmin)/∆X is the index of X(t).
The pseudo code of the algorithm for valuing a primary option is listed in
Table 3.1, and that for valuing a secondary option is listed in Table 3.2. The pseudo
codes illustrate that the exercise decision for the primary option at any time t and
any possible spot rate at that time X(t) involves valuing the corresponding secondary
option at that state. Consequently, the computational time is driven up substantially.
3.4. RESULT ANALYSIS
3.4.1. Numerical Examples. A numerical example of TC contracts is dis-
cussed here to illustrate both the cost and benefit of the preemptive right of price
adjustment flexibility. The cost paid by the holder of preemptive right is determined
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Table 3.1: Pseudo Code of the Algorithm for Valuing a Primary Option V P
0. Build a 2D grid of size N ×M :
N ← T/∆s,
M ← (Xmax −Xmin)/∆X.
1. Define terminal condition: V Pi,j ← 0 for i = N and any j.
2. Value the option backward:
for i = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0
Determine the expected value of continuation, V Pi,j :
for boundary points (j = 0,M), use the explicit method in Eqns. (3.16-3.19);
for interior points (j = 1, . . . ,M − 1), use the implicit method in Eqns.
(3.20-3.21).
Determine the intrinsic value of exercising the option, Gi,j :
if V Pi,j = V
PC
i,j
Gi,j ← GPC(j∆X, i∆s) defined in Eqn. (3.7),
else
Gi,j ← GPP (j∆X, i∆s) defined in Eqn. (3.11).
end.
Determine the value of primary option:
V Pi,j ← max{V Pi,j , Gi,j}.
end.
3. The value of the primary option at time zero is V P
0,j˜
, where j˜ ← (X(0)−Xmin)/∆X.
Table 3.2: Pseudo Code of the Algorithm for Valuing a Seconary Option V S
0. Build a 2D grid of size (N − i)×M :
N ← T/∆s,
M ← (Xmax −Xmin)/∆X,
i← t/∆s.
1. Define terminal condition: V Si′,j ← 0 for i′ = N and any j.
2. Value the option backward:
for i′ = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , i
Determine the expected value of continuation, V Si′,j :
for boundary points (j = 0,M), use the explicit method in Eqns. (3.16-3.19);
for interior points (j = 1, . . . ,M − 1), use the implicit method in Eqns.
(3.20-3.21).
Determine the intrinsic value of exercising the option, Gi′,j :
if V Si′,j = V
SC
i′,j
Gi′,j ← GSC(j∆X, i′∆s) defined in Eqn. (3.14),
else
Gi′,j ← GSP (j∆X, i′∆s) defined in Eqn. (3.10).
end.
Determine the value of the secondary option:
V Si′,j ← max{V Si′,j , Gi′,j}.
end.
3. The value of secondary option at time t is V S
i,j˜′ , where j˜
′ ← (X(t)−Xmin)/∆x.
55
by the primary option’s value; the return from the preemptive right is random, de-
pending on the evolution of spot rate in the market. There are three possible scenarios
of option exercise:
• Double Exercises (2E) Scenario: The market rate is favorable for the primary
option holder and, thus, the option holder exercises the option. Later, the
market rate reverses enough so that the secondary option is exercised too.
• Single Exercise (1E) Scenario: The market rate is favorable for the primary
option holder and, thus, the holder exercises the option. The market rate,
however, never reverses enough for the secondary option holder to exercise her
option.
• No Exercise (0E) Scenario: The market rate is unfavorable for the primary op-
tion holder and, thus, she does not exercise her option, killing the secondary op-
tion (although the market rate may go in favor of the secondary option holder).
Consider a 5-year TC contract (one year = 360 days) written in the maritime
transportation market. The risk-neutral, long-term steady rate, α∗, is 40 × 103 dol-
lar/day, the spot rate volatility, σ, is 3 × 103 dollar/day3/2, and the reverting speed
of the spot rate, k, is 1 per year. Values of spot rate model parameters were de-
termined based on practical data available in the literature [44]. The continuously
compounded risk-free rate, r, was assumed fixed at 5% per year. We built an appro-
priate grid for the FDM using Xmax = $130 × 103 dollar/day, Xmin = −$60 × 103
dollar/day, ∆X = 1× 103 dollar/day, and ∆s = 10 days.
The following is an examples of the preemptive right held by the lessor. At an
initial spot rate of 20× 103 dollar/day, the original TC contract rate, F (20× 103, 0),
is 35.717× 103 dollar/day. The lessor (ship owner) in a TC contract expects the spot
rate to go up because the current rate is significantly lower than the long-term steady
rate of 40 × 103 dollar/day. This owner wants to protect against a potential future
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earnings loss (from having hired out the ship for a price lower than the market price)
and thus buys a preemptive right to adjust the contracted TC rate to the prevailing
rate once during the contract’s life. The cost to obtain this right is the value of the
primary call option, V PC(X(0), 0), which is equal to $6.337× 106. Because the value
of the lease contract is $56.884 × 106, the preemptive right of the price adjustment
flexibility is expected to add 11.1% value to the contract. Table 3.3 summarizes the
example results.
The free boundary of an option is an optimized tool for supporting the exercise
decision. It divides the state space into two zones: “exercising the option” zone and
“holding the option” zone. The option is exercised when the spot rate crosses the
free boundary the first time. Fig. 3.1 illustrates the free boundary of primary call
option, three random sample paths of the spot rate (with each corresponding to one
of the three scenarios), and two free boundaries of the secondary put option (with
one for the 2E scenario and the other for the 1E scenario).
Table 3.3: Examples of The Preemptive Right Held by the Lessor
X(0), [thousand dollar/day] 20.000
dX(t) = (40000−X(t))dt+ 3000dZ∗(t)
F (X(0), 0) , [thousand dollar/day] 35.717
Value of TC contract w/o options, [million dollar] 56.884
Price of the preemptive right, [million dollar] 6.337
Examples
2E 1E 0E
Exercise time of the primary call, tP , [year] 0.555 2.744 N/A
Prevailing rate,F (X(tP ), tP ), [thousand dollar/day] 50.243 53.665 N/A
Gain from the option exercise [million dollar] 20.843 13.782 N/A
Exercise time of the secondary put, tS, [year] 3.194 N/A N/A
Prevailing rate,F (X(tS), tS), [thousand dollar/day] 29.088 N/A N/A
Loss from the option exercise [million dollar] 13.151 N/A N/A
Net gain (loss) [million dollar] 2.725 5.678 -6.337
Net gain (loss)/Original contract value 4.8% 10.0% -11.1%
Net return from preemptive right 43.0% 89.6% -100%
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Figure 3.1: Primary Call - Secondary Put: An Illustrative Example
The random path displayed as dash curve in Fig. 3.1 illustrates the 2E
scenario. The spot rate goes up to 83.500 × 103 dollar/day and crosses the free
boundary of the primary call option (the bold solid curve) at time 0.555 years. The
call option is then exercised and the TC rate is adjusted to the prevailing rate,
F (83.500× 103, 0.555). This rate is equal to 50.243× 103 dollar/day. The exercise of
the primary call option increases the income cash flows for the lessor, equivalent to
$20.743× 106 at time 0.555 years. The exercise of the primary call option provides a
secondary put option to the lessee. The value of the secondary put option is worth
$15.074 × 106 (assessed at time 0.555 years). The corresponding free boundary of
the secondary option is the bold dash curve illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The spot rate
reverses down to 16.500 × 103 dollar/day and crosses the free boundary of the sec-
ondary put option at time 3.194 years. The lessee, as the holder of the secondary
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put option, exercises the option and the TC rate is re-adjusted to the prevailing rate,
F (16.500×103, 3.194), equal to 29.088×103 dollar/day. The exercise of the secondary
put reduces the incomes cash flows to the lessor, equivalent to $13.151× 106 at time
3.194 years. The net gain for the preemptive right holder is $2.725×106 (the net gain
is evaluated at time zero and after the option price deducted). The preemptive right
increases the lease value by 4.8%. The net return from investing in the flexibility
with the preemptive right is 43.0%.
The random path displayed as dotted curve in Fig. 3.1 illustrates the 1E
scenario. The spot rate goes up to 74.000 × 103 dollar/day and crosses the free
boundary of the primary call option at time 2.744 years. Consequently, the primary
option’s holder exercises the option at that point in time. The TC rate is then
adjusted to the prevailing TC freight rate, F (74.000×103, 2.744), equal to 53.665×103
dollar/day. Exercising the primary call option increases the income cash flows to the
lessor, equivalent to $13.782× 106 at time 2.744 years, as well as grants a secondary
put option to the counterparty worth of $8.3754 × 106 at then. The corresponding
free boundary of the secondary put option is illustrated by the solid dotted curve.
The spot rate, however, never reverses strongly enough to trigger an exercise of the
secondary put. Consequently, the rate adjustment made a net gain of $5.678 × 106
or a 10.0% increase in the lease value to the lessor. The net return from investing in
the preemptive right is 89.6%.
The random path displayed as dash-dotted curve in Fig. 3.1 illustrates the
0E scenario. The spot rate in this scenario is never high enough to cross the free
boundary of the primary call option. Therefore, the primary call option expires and
is worthless. Although the spot rate has gone very low during the contract life, the
lessee (the secondary option’s holder) is not allowed to adjust the contracted TC rate
because the preemptive right of adjusting the lease rate belongs to the lessor. In this
scenario the lessor loses the amount of money she paid for the flexibility, equal to
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11.1% of lease value; however, the TC contract has guaranteed her the contracted
TC rate regardless of how low the market prices go during the contract life. The
following is an examples of the preemptive right held by the lessee. At an initial
spot rate of 60 × 103 dollar/day, the original TC contract rate, F (60 × 103, 0), is
44.283 × 103 dollar/day. A lessee (charterer) who expects the spot price to fall and
wants to protect against a potential future loss (from having hired in a ship at a price
higher than the market rate), buys a preemptive right to adjust the TC rate once
during the contract’s life. This right is equivalent to a primary put option. The put
option price, V PP (X(0), 0), is equal to $6.345 × 106. Because the value of the TC
contract is $70.527 × 106, the preemptive right is expected to increase the contract
value by 9.0%. Table 3.4 summarizes the example results.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the free boundary of primary put option, three random
sample paths of spot rate (with each corresponding to one of the three representa-
tive scenarios), and two free boundaries of the two secondary call options (with one
associated with the 2E scenario and the other associated with the 1E scenario).
The random sample path displayed as dash curve in Fig. 3.2 illustrates the
2E scenario. The spot rate falls to −22.500 × 103 dollar/day (the negative value
is acceptable as the rate is represented by the net cash flow) and crosses the free
boundary of primary put option at time 1.833 years. Consequently, the primary put
option is exercised, and the TC rate is adjusted to the prevailing rate, F (−22.500×
103, 1.833), which is equal to 20.407 × 103 dollar/day. The exercise of the primary
put option reduces the cash flows the lessee will pay during the contract’s remaining
life, equivalent to $25.173 × 106 at time 1.833 years. The contract grants the lessor
a secondary call option worth $8.330× 106 for the contract’s remaining life once the
primary put option is exercised. The free boundary of the secondary call option is
displayed as the solid dash curve in Fig. 3.2. The spot rate then reverses up to
48.500 × 103 dollar/day, crossing the free boundary of the secondary call option at
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Figure 3.2: Put option Illustrative Example
Table 3.4: Examples of Preemptive Right Held by the Lessee
X(0), [thousand dollar/day] 60.000
dX(t) = (40000−X(t))dt+ 3000dZ∗(t)
F (X(0), 0) , [thousand dollar/day] 44.283
Value of TC contract w/o options, [million dollar] 70.527
Price of the preemptive right, [million dollar] 6.345
Examples
2E 1E 0E
Exercise time of the primary call, tP , [year] 1.833 2.979 N/A
Prevailing rate,F ((tP ), TP ), [thousand dollar/day] 20.407 18.655 N/A
Gain from the option exercise [million dollar] 25.173 17.731 N/A
Exercise time of the secondary put, tS, [year] 3.305 N/A N/A
Prevailing rate,F (X(tS), tS), [thousand dollar/day] 44.142 N/A N/A
Loss from the option exercise [million dollar] 13.886 N/A N/A
Net gain (loss) [million dollar] 4.852 8.932 -6.345
Net gain (loss)/Original contract value 6.9% 12.7% -9.0%
Net return from the preemptive right 76.5% 140.8% -100%
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3.305 years. At this time the lessor exercises the secondary call option, and the TC
rate is re-adjusted to the prevailing TC rate, F (48.500×103, 3.305). The rate is equal
to 44.142 × 103 dollar/day. The exercise of the secondary call option increases the
cash flows the lessee will pay during the remaining life of the contract, equivalent to
$13.886 × 106 at the time of 3.305 years. The net gain from this case is $4.852 ×
106, which increases the lease value by 6.9%. The net return from investing in the
preemptive right is 76.5% in this case.
The random path, displayed as dotted curve, illustrates the 1E scenario. The
spot rate falls to −9.500×103 dollar/day and crosses the free boundary of the primary
put option at 2.979 years. Consequently, the primary put option is exercised, and
the TC rate is adjusted to the prevailing rate, F (−9.500× 103, 2.979), which is equal
to 18.655 × 103 dollar/day. The exercise of the primary put option saves a value
of $17.731 × 106 for the lessee starting at 2.979 years. The free boundary of the
secondary call option is illustrated in Fig. 3.2 in solid dotted curve; the spot rate
never reverses strongly enough to cross that boundary. The net gain the lessee made
is $8.932 × 106, equivalent to 12.7% net increase in the lease value. The net return
from investing in the preemptive right is 140.8%.
The random path in dash-dotted curve is a case of the 0E scenario. The spot
rate never falls low enough to cross the free boundary of the primary put option. The
primary put option thus expires and is worthless. Although the spot rate has gone
very high during the contract life, the lessor is not allowed to request for adjusting
the spot rate because the lessee has the preemptive right. In this case, the lessee
loses the option price she paid, approximately 9.0% of the lease value. Again, the TC
lease contract has guaranteed the lessee the contracted TC rate regardless how high
the market price climbs during the contract life.
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The following discusses the preemptive right holder’s decision behavior. To
understand the impact of double-sided flexibility to the decision behavior of the pri-
mary option holder, this work analyzes the secondary option’s value. This is because
the secondary option is the in-kind exercise cost for the primary option in the ROs
model.
Figure 3.3 displays the value of the secondary put option on the state space,
and that of the secondary call option is illustrated on Fig. 3.4. The figures suggest
that the in-kind exercise price decreases as time passes. This indicates that the
double-sided flexibility may motivate the owner of the primary option to delay the
option exercise to limit the chance of exercising the secondary option. This explains
the reason for the primary options being exercised relatively early in the contract
life in the 2E scenario and yet relatively late in the 1E scenario. While delaying the
exercise of the primary option limits the chance of exercising the secondary option, it
also reduces the benefit of cash flow increase. Therefore, the owner of the preemptive
right have to consider the trade-off between the exercise cost and the profit of cash
flow increase when deciding on the timing of option exercise.
The figures also show that the in-kind exercise cost for the primary put option,
V SC(X(t), t), decreases as the spot rate rises. In contrast, the in-kind exercise cost
for the primary call option, V SP (X(t), t), decreases as the spot rate drops. Therefore,
the double-sided flexibility motivates the owner of the preemptive right to move the
free boundary of the primary option towards the steady rate α∗ in order to reduce
the value of the secondary option to the counterparty. This, however, is at the cost
of reducing the benefit of cash flow increase. The double-sided flexibility requires
participants, particularly the owner of the preemptive right, to assess their decisions
from a game perspective.
3.4.2. Sensitivity Analysis. Sensitivity analysis can test both the explana-
tory validity as well as the consistency of the ROs model with classic option theories.
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Figure 3.3: In-kind exercise price for the primary call option held by the lessor
Figure 3.4: In-kind exercise price for the primary put option held by the lessee
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This analysis also helps clarify how the value of a preemptive right is impacted by the
spot rate dynamics. The sensitivity of the value of primary options to the changes in
spot rate model parameters is given in Fig. 3.5. Major findings include the following:
• Reverting speed, k: The reverting speed is a decisive factor in determining
the value of the rate adjustment flexibility with the preemptive right. Figs.
3.5(a) and 3.5(b) illustrate that an increase in k value quickly reduces the value
of the primary option. This observation can be explained by the dynamic
process of spot rate. Eqn. (3.2) indicates that the spot rate in a time interval
dt, X(t + dt), follows a normal distribution. The mean of X(t + dt) is equal
to the weighted average of the risk-neutral long-term rate, α∗, and the current




. An increase in the value
of k quickly reduces both the standard deviation of X(t+dt) and the weight on
X(t) (i.e., e−kdt). The dominating factor for determining the future spot rate
then becomes α∗. In extreme situations the spot rate follows a Wiener process
when k is equal to zero; it follows a deterministic process (i.e., X(t) = α∗) when
k goes to infinity. In summary, a fast reverting speed restricts the variability of
the spot rate, lowering the primary option’ price accordingly.
• Volatility, σ: Figs. 3.5(c) and 3.5(d) show that the value of primary options
grows as the volatility increases. This observation is consistent with classic
option theories and can be explained by Eqn. (3.2). The standard deviation of
X(t + dt) is proportional to σ. Therefore, a large value of volatility enlarges
future spot rate’s distribution and, thus, increases the value of primary options.
• Contract term, T : The manner in which the contract term impacts the
preemptive rights’ value is quite interesting. As T is prolonged, the preemptive
right’s value first increases and then decreases as illustrated in Figs. 3.5(e)
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Figure 3.5: Sensitivity of the Preemptive Right’s Value to the Spot Rate Model
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and 3.5(f). This observation conflicts with classic option theories. The non-
monotonic change of options value is related to the in-kind exercise cost for
primary options. A lengthy contract term results in a high exercise cost that
may outweigh the benefit the lengthy contract term can bring to the primary
option. Therefore, the preemptive right’s value may be decreased by a very
long contract term.
• Initial spot rate, X(0): Figs. 3.5(g) and 3.5(h) suggest that an increase in
the initial spot rate increases and decreases the value of the primary put and
call options, respectively. The underlying reason for this observation is that the
original TC rate, F (X(0), 0), is positively related to X(0), and the value of the
primary put and call options are increased and decreases, respectively, by an
increase in F (X(0), 0).
• Risk-neutral long-term rate, α∗: Figs. 3.5(i) and 3.5(j) show that a decrease
in the primary put option value, and an increase in the primary call option
value, are associated with an increase in the risk-neutral long-term rate. This
observation can be explained by Eqn. (3.2), which indicates that a higher spot
rate is expected if the value of α∗ increases. Moreover, the value of the primary
put and call option is negatively and positively, respectively, impacted by an
increase in X(t).
3.4.3. Discounted and Premium TC Contracts. Embedding the double-
sided price adjustment flexibility in a lease contract results in either a discount on the
TC rate (when the preemptive right is held by the lessor) or a premium above the TC
rate (when the preemptive right is held by the lessee). The level of discount/premium
is dependent on both the contract term and the spot rate at the time of the contract
underwriting (according to the sensitivity analysis discussed in the previous section).
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The ROs model presented in this section can help determine both the discount and
the premium levels.
Table 3.5: The price of the preemptive right as a contract discount (%) to the lessee
Spot Rate, X(0)
[thousand dollar/day]
10 15 20 25 30
Contract Term, T
3 16.65 13.91 11.76 10.04 8.64
4 14.11 12.04 10.35 8.95 7.78
5 11.94 10.33 8.99 7.84 6.87
[year] 6 10.18 8.89 7.78 6.84 6.03
7 8.75 7.68 6.77 5.98 5.30
Table 3.6: The price of preemptive right as a contract premium (%) to the lessor
Spot Rate, X(0)
[thousand dollar/day]
30 45 60 75 90
Contract Term, T
3 10.32 11.02 11.77 12.55 13.35
4 8.43 9.36 10.36 11.42 12.50
5 6.99 7.94 9.00 10.14 11.34
[year] 6 5.89 6.77 7.80 8.94 10.18
7 5.01 5.83 6.78 7.88 9.12
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 respectively illustrate the discount and premium for TC
contracts with different contract terms and spot rates at underwriting. For example,
a lessor who enters a 4-year TC contract when the spot rate is 15 × 103 dollar/day
would provide a discount of 12.04% to the lessee to obtain the preemptive right. In
negotiating a longer life contract, for example a 6-year contract, the lessor would
only give an 8.89% discount to the lessee for the preemptive right. Similarly, a lessee
entering a 4-year TC contract when the spot rate is 75 × 103 dollar/day would pay
a premium of 11.42% to the lessor to buy the preemptive right. If the spot rate at
contract underwriting is 45× 103 dollar/day, the premium is reduced to 9.36%.
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3.4.4. Computational Complexity. The interdependence between option
holders’ decisions increases the computational complexity. The valuation of the pri-
mary option at any point (except for i = N) on the grid requires the valuation of
the secondary option at the same point. The valuation of the secondary option at
any point (i, j) involves solving the system of M − 1 linear equations defined in Eqn.
(3.20) for N + 1 − i times. Consequently, the linear equation system needs to be
solved for 0.5(N + 1)N(M + 1) +N times to determine the primary option value at
time zero.
The values of ∆t and ∆X that define M and N , respectively, substantially
affect the computational time and result accuracy. Valuation experiments are coded
using Matlab to illustrate how the selections of ∆t and ∆X impact both the result
accuracy and the computational time. The experiments are performed on a work-
station (Dell T7500: 2 quad-core Intel R©Xeon R©processors CPU, 1.4 GHz and 2.39
GHz, 48GB RAM). Results are listed in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.
The computational time increases as both ∆t and ∆X decrease. According
to the complexity formula (derived above), reducing the time step ∆t to one-third
should increase the computational time for approximately nine times. The results of
the average computational times listed in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are relatively consistent
with the analytical results of computational complexity. Reduction of ∆X not only
increases the number of times the linear equation system is valued but also the size of
the linear equation system. For example, when ∆X is reduced by half, the number of
times the linear equation system solved doubles and the computational time should
increase by more than two times. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 suggest that a decrease in ∆X
either from 2.0×103 dollar/day to 1.0×103 dollar/day or from 1.0×103 dollar/day to
0.5× 103 dollar/day prolongs the computational time for approximately eight times.
As both ∆t and ∆X become smaller, the result accuracy becomes better.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 indicate that the result accuracy is more sensitive to a change in
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Table 3.7: Result accuracy and average computational time: Primary call option
Primary call value1 ∆X [thousand dollar/day]
Avg. comp. time2 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0
10
6.337 6.337 6.336 6.333 6.324
2.934e+04 3.833e+03 4.871e+02 3.644e+01 8.244e+00
∆t [day]
30
6.241 6.241 6.240 6.238 6.231
3.636e+03 4.333e+02 5.636e+01 4.243e+00 9.575e-01
90
6.078 6.078 6.078 6.076 6.074
4.193e+02 5.034e+01 6.696e+00 5.355e-01 1.340e-01
1. Option values are in millions of dollars;
2. Average computational times are in seconds and based on five replications.
Table 3.8: Result accuracy and average computational time: Primary put option
Primary put value1 ∆X [thousand dollar/day]
Avg. comp. time2 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0
10
6.345 6.345 6.345 6.342 6.336
2.870e+04 3.725e+03 4.651e+02 3.646e+01 7.601e+00
∆t [day]
30
6.249 6.249 6.248 6.247 6.241
3.471e+03 4.204e+02 5.266e+01 4.135e+00 9.304e-01
90
6.084 6.084 6.084 6.083 6.082
4.112e+02 4.817e+01 6.103e+00 5.186e-01 1.278e-01
1. Option values are in millions of dollars;
2. Average computational times are in seconds and based on five replications.
∆t than it is to the change in ∆X within the range of study. Moreover, a good trade-
off between the computational time and the results accuracy seems to be obtained at
∆t = 10 days and ∆X = 1× 103 dollar/day.
3.5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This essay developed the double-sided price adjustment flexibility for the lease
industry that is practicing in highly volatile markets. The double-sided flexibility
adds a valuable option to the negotiation of flexibility clauses. The preemptive right
of the price adjustment flexibility can be obtained by any party at a certain cost in
order to enjoy superior flexibility over the counterparty. The double-sided flexibility
complements the risk management capability of fixed rate lease contracts, and it is
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a tool more accessible to participants than derivatives. A ROs methodology was
developed to model, value, and optimize the use of the flexibility held by each party
of a lease contract. The developed methodology also helped obtain an insightful
understanding of the decision behavior of participants who have options. The model
was applied to TC contract examples from the volatile maritime lease market, which
proved both the reliability and the applicability of the developed ROs framework.
The same flexibility design is also applicable to other forms of lease contracts as well
as to other contract relationships such as supply chain contracts. This work also
contributes to the ROs literature by pushing the boundary of ROs applications.
The proposed model can be extended in a number of directions. One impor-
tant direction of future studies is to model other attractive forms of flexibility, such
as, the non-preemptive right of the rate adjustment flexibility, where both parties of
the contract have an equal, parallel flexibility. The double-sided multiple-exercisable
flexibility is also an important flexibility design worth of studying. Another study
direction is to relax the model’s assumptions and use more realistic spot price dy-
namics models (e.g., the Geometric Mean Reverting process). Finally this work can
be improved by implementing multiple factor models that include other risk factors,
such as the stochastic interest rate, in the options valuation. Such extensions would
provide a richer picture of both the design and pricing of lease contract flexibilities.
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4. REAL OPTIONS MODELING AND VALUATION OF
DOUBLE-SIDED PRICE ADJUSTMENT FLEXIBILITY WITH
THE NON-PREEMPTIVE RIGHT TO EXERCISE
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Much economic activity takes place within a framework of long-term contracts.
Long-term contracts enable economic actors to coordinate their behavior[75]. Long-
term contracts are popular in property lease in many domains, such as real estate,
heavy equipment and transportation industry. Operating leasing separates property
ownership from property use. The lessor receives the lease payments and the residual
property value while the lessee receives the right to use the property over the lease
term [65]. Lessors offer better pricing for long-term lease, because they have a longer
stream of cash flow that minimizes their risk. Short term contracts incur more cost
to all parties including re-negotiation cost. Long-term leases locks contract parties
in for the contract term. This is an important shortcoming to the traditional long-
term leases. This is an inherent shortcoming to the traditional long-term contracts.
Obviously, contract parties would look for different kinds of appropriate flexibility in
long-term contracts.
The flexibility in adjusting the lease price is an alternative tool for managing
the price risk. The price uncertainty in the volatile business environment of the 21st
century makes price flexibility even more valuable to both contract parties. In general
price flexibility lessens price risk by limiting losses in downturn economic conditions
and/or taking advantage of upturn economic conditions. However, flexibilities don’t
go without a price, flexibility seeker agrees to pay a premium to a lease contract
counterparty to incorporate a specific flexibility in its lease.
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Traditional long-term contracts do not allow participants to take advantages
of favorable price movement, which is a limitation to long-term contracts. Some
flexible rate leases have been practiced in leasing industry to overcome this limitation.
Example of rate flexible leases is the Up-ward Only Rate Review (UORR) clause in
the real estate industry. A lease in which landlords have the option to review the
initial rental figure in line with market conditions at pre-determined intervals [2]. In
the UORR, the possible adjustments (typically every five years) are known as rent
reviews. If rents in the market have increased over the interim period, the rent will
be adjusted upwards. However, if market rents have decreased, landlords will choose
not to invoke the rent review clause and the existing rent will continue [76]. The
UORR flexibility was considered fair to both lessee and lessor. It was fair to the
lessor because it enabled the lessor to obtain a fair rent instead of a rent far below
that which reflects the value of the property, and both inflationary and real increases
in rents. It was fair to the lessee because, without it, under inflationary conditions,
it would not be possible for a lessee to obtain a long-term lease [77].
Turnover (or overage or percentage) rent contracts is another flexible rate
lease exists in some retail leases. Turnover contract specify that lessee will pay a base
rent and a turnover rent equal to a percentage of the difference between sales in the
current period and threshold sales, if the difference is positive [78]. In down markets
lessee pays base rent. In high markets lessee’s sales increases and lessor’s gets the
base plus the overage. Leasing, however, is not limited to real estates. Almost all
expensive equipment and assets can be leased and lease industry is growing in the
modern economy. For example, more than 33% of the worlds aviation fleet is rented
and the proportion is likely to keep growing [79].
The lease rate flexibility in practice and in the literature are generally one-sided
flexibility. However, a double-sided flexible rate lease is potentially more fair to both
the lessor and the lessee. In their study [80] proposed a DSPAF in operating leases.
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They suggested a rate flexibility in the form of an embedded real option in the lease.
This flexibility gives the option holder the right but not the obligation to exercise the
option and adjust the contract rate to the prevailing rate, when it is financially sound.
The exercise right, however, is preemptive to the primary option holder. Only when
primary option holder exercise her option the counterparty is granted a secondary
option to re-adjust the rate. This was the first work that introduces the DSPAF in
lease contracts in the literature. The preemptive right flexibility to primary option
holder is superior over the other party right. The preemptive right suits certain rate
flexibility requirements, paricularly, when contract parties have different market price
expectations or when one party is more concerned about the price risk and willing to
pay for the flexibility.
This study sought to develop a DSPAF in the form of non-preemptive right
that provides equal, parallel right to both contract parties. The non-preemptive right
flexibility is expected to come for a price that is less than the preemptive right flexi-
bility as both parties enjoys similar and equal flexibility. The non-preemptive right is
expected to meets contracts parties flexibility requirements in more cooperative rela-
tionship context. When both parties have concerns about the future price dramatic
movements, yet unable to predict the price trend. The non-preemptive right flexi-
bility is expexted to suit situations when both parties agree on equally sharing the
flexibility to the reduce flexibility cost. Moreover, the preemptive right along with the
non-preemptive right could make different lease flexibility alternatives for participants
with different flexibility requirement and budgets. The non-preemptive right can be
more attractive to participants working in lease markets where derivatives are not
available. The valuation of the non-preemptive right, however, could be challenging
considering the interaction between the contract parties exercise decisions.
The remainder of this essay is organized in the following manner. Section
2 summarizes relevant literature. Section 3 both models and values lease contracts
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with an embedded non-preemptive right with application to TC contracts. Section
4 present numerical examples and result analysis. Findings from this research and
discussions of future research are summarized in Section 5.
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In general, valuing lease contracts from a real options perspective is already
well developed [2]. For example, used an endogenously derived term-structure for
lease rates. Grenadier, determined the equilibrium lease rates for many different
types of leases under various economic assumptions [64]. Lease prices flexibility has
also been an area of interest for many researchers. The primary focus, however, has
been on both analyzing and valuing commonly practiced forms of price adjustable
contracts in real estate commercial lease. The practiced forms of adjustable price
contracts are one-sided flexibility models. In essence they are agreements that allow
the lessor additional rent over a minimum base. Contracts are often fashioned in dis-
crete time when the price is reviewed periodically and then reset according to certain
market conditions, often either inflation-indexing or market reviews. Examples of the
adjustable lease contracts include the UORR.
The up-ward only price adjustment in a real estate market has been the focus
of many studies. Ward et al. (1988) concluded that the UORR option premium is
significant. they suggested the removal of the UORR clause from a lease contract
would lead to a significant increase in the initial rent [76]. Ward and French (1997)
used the Black-Scholes option-pricing equation and determined that an UORR has
value to landlords. They demonstrated that approximately 17% of a lease’s value is
attributed to “upward only” constraints [81].
Ward et al. (1998) simulated a stochastic rent generating process, concluding
that, for their UK lease example, a rental uplift of between 5 % and 16 % should
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apply to a lease with a UORR clause versus one without [76]. Booth and Walsh
(2001) applied an adjusted standard option-pricing technique to the valuation of
UORR properties [82]. Ambrose et al. (2002) presented a stochastic pricing model
of upward-only adjusting leases. They developed an implicit equation for securities
with path dependent cash flows and then applied it to the upward-only adjusting
lease [2].
Another example of lease rate adjustment flexibility is the Percentage Lease
Agreement (PLA). PLA or turnover rent) used in retail leases for multi-tenanted
shopping centers. In PLA the lessee pays a flat base rent plus a turnover-related
income. Hendershott and Ward (2000) treated the overage rent as a call option on
the tenant’s sale turnover. They applied the binomial option pricing approach to
pricing the option. Hendershott and Ward (2000) demonstrated that ignoring the
impact of future uncertainties on overage rents may underestimate the lease value by
more than 10% [74].
Chiang et al.(1986) treated the tenant’s obligation to either pay a percentage
or turnover rent as if the landlord had a call option contingent on gross sales [83]. In
contrast, Lee (1995) demonstrated that a percentage rent in a retail lease shares the
risks of the variations in the success of the tenant’s business. Therefore the expected
rent should be higher than the fixed rent [84]. These studies revealed that practiced
adjustable rate options significantly affect the contract’s value. Provided flexibility,
however, is one-sided and does not meet recent economic changes.
The maritime transportation market (the application of this essay), known for
it’s price volatility and high competition, is another important lease market. In this
market both ships and tankers can be leased under Time Charter (TC) contracts for
only a few months, or up to several years. [85] introduced and valued a new option to
adjust price in the TC contract. The option also offers one-sided flexibility. However,
unlike former options, this option is an American option and exercise is allowed any
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time during the contract’s term. Al sharif and Qin modeled both the ship owners
call option and the charterers put option. This put option allows the option owner,
at a predefined exercise price, the right to adjust the lease price once. [80] added
a DSPAF to the TC lease contract, allowing one party to enjoy superior flexibility
by buying a preemptive right on that flexibility. They utilized the in-kind exercise
feature to create DSPAF. The level of flexibility, however, is unequal. The primary
option owner is given the preemptive right to adjust the price. The other party,
however, is given a secondary option to re-adjust the price only after the primary
option has been exercised.
A non-preemptive DSPAF equally serves both contract parties. It is also
expected to be cheaper than preemptive flexibility and is thus more attractive to
participants with certain flexibility requirements.
4.3. THE MODEL
This section illustrates both the modeling and the valuation methods for TC
contracts from the maritime transport industry. The modeling of a lease contract
depends on the contract type, the variables underlying the contract, and features of
the lease market. The same methodology, however, can be adopted by other lease
contracts in different lease markets.
4.3.1. Valuing Lease Contracts without the DSPAF. This study mod-
eled the time charter equivalent (TCE) spot market freight rate, X(t), as an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (OU) mean-reverting process, a widely applied stochastic model of the spot
freight rate discussed in the maritime transportation literature (e.g., [36]). It is also a
model of the real estate lease price (e.g., [82]). The dynamics of X(t) in a risk-neutral
world is defined as
dX(t) = k(α∗ −X(t))dt+ σdZ∗(t), (4.1)
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where k is the reverting speed, α∗ is the long-term steady rate under the risk-neutral
measurement, σ is the instantaneous volatility of the spot rate, and Z∗(t) is the
one-dimensional standard Wiener process under the risk-neutral measurement.
The instantaneous cash flow generated by an operating vessel is
D(t)dt = (aX(t)− b)dt, (4.2)
where a is the size of the cargo (which is equal to 1 when a freight is quoted for the
entire ship) and b denotes the rate of total cost (including both operating costs and
capital expenses).
According to the non-arbitrage assumption, the value of the TC contract is
equal to that of the spot rate contracts within the same time frame. Therefore, the
prevailing TC rate beginning at time t and ending at time T , F (X(t), t), is calculated
with
F (X(t), t) = a
A(T − t, r + k)
A(T − t, r) X(t) +
[
1− A(T − t, r + k)
A(T − t, r)
]
α∗ − b. (4.3)
The A(r, t) in Eqn. (4.3) is the annuity value factor equal to (1− e−rt)/r. Equation
(4.3) indicates that the TC rate is a linear function of the spot rate. Both the slope
and the intercept, however, vary as time passes. Therefore, the stochastic movement
of the spot rate may take the prevailing fixed rate, F (X(t), t), away from the initial
fixed rate, F (X(0), 0), in an unpredictable manner.
4.3.2. Modeling the DSPAF with the Non-Preemptive Right. The
DSPAF, as described in Fig. 4.1, are two real options written on the same underly-
ing asset. Each contract party keeps one of the options and gives the other to the
counterparty. For example, the lessor holds a call option that allows her to receive
additional cash flows when the spot rate rises high enough to trigger the exercise
of the call option. Meanwhile, she provides to the lessee a put option that requires
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herself to reduce the lease rate if the lessee exercises the put option. Thus, the two
options cannot be exercised simultaneously. That is,
Lemma: If both contract parties exercise their options, these two options must be
exercised sequentially.
Proof: Assume that both contract parties exercise their options at time t. Without
loss of generality, assume the exercise of the call option is associated with cash inflows
for the lessor during the remaining contract life: {∆CF call(τ) ≥ 0|t ≤ τ ≤ T}. The
cash flows to the lessee associated with the exercise of the put option at the same
time are {∆CF put(τ)|t ≤ τ ≤ T}, and ∆CF put(τ) = −∆CF call(τ) at any time τ .
Therefore, the assumption contradicts to the fact that the lessee would not exercise
her option if the payoff from exercising the option is negative. 
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Figure 4.1: Schematic Diagram of the Double-Sided Price Adjustment Flexibility
Asecondary option is defined here as the option in which the counterparty’s
option has already been exercised. Otherwise, the option is a primary option. In the
remaining of the essay, PC, PP, SC, SP stand for the primary call option, primary
put option, secondary call option, and secondary put option, respectively.
An optimal exercise policy for an option specifying that the critical spot rate
triggers an exercise of the option. This critical rate may vary as time. consequently,
the optimal exercise policy is represented by a trajectory of the critical spot rate on
the time horizon. This is termed as free boundary of option exercise. The optimal
exercise policy for the DSPAF with the non-preemptive right to exercise consists of
four boundaries of option exercise. For a non-preemptive right to exercise case. Both
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contract parties hold a primary option until their counterparty exercises her option.
Therefore, the optimal exercise policy is first specified for the primary options, and
then for the secondary options.
Under the constraint of a non-preemptive right, either the lessor or the lessee
can be the first to exercise her option. Therefore, the state space, {(X(t), t)|0 ≤ t ≤
T}, is divided into three zones: 1) “no options have been exercised yet (NE)”, 2) the
“primary call option has been exercised (PCE)”, and 3) “the primary put option has
been exercised (PPE)”. these three zones are separated by two boundaries, (see Fig.
4.2) (a), the three zones are separated by two boundaries. The upper boundary is the
free boundary of the primary call option that specifies the trajectory of the critical
spot rate, triggering the exercise of the primary call option. The lower boundary is
the free boundary of the primary put option. These two boundaries neither cross
noor meet each other before the contract ends, according to the Lemma.
If the primary call option is exercised, the put option held by the lessee im-
mediately becomes the secondary put option. The exercise policy for the secondary
put option is the trajectory of the critical spot rate, triggering the exercise of this
option. Figure 4.2 (b) illustrates that the state space for the remaining life of the
contract (the shaded area) is separated by the free boundary of the secondary put
option into two zones: 1) “secondary put option exercised (SPE)” and 2) “secondary
put option not exercised (SPN)”. The optimal exercise policy for the secondary call
option, presented as the free boundary of it, is illustrated in Fig. 4.2 (c).
4.3.3. The Optimal Policy of Option Exercise. Determination of the
optimal exercise policy for an option involves defining the trajectory of the critical
spot rate for the option (the free boundary for exercising the option). To find the
critical spot rate for an option at any time t requires determining both the option
value at t, V (X(t), t) and the intrinsic value of exercising the option, G(X(t), t).
This essay also uses superscripts to indicate different types of options. For example,
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Figure 4.2: Schematic Diagram of the Optimal Exercise Policy as Four Free Bound-
aries of Option Exercise
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V PC(X(t), t) designates the value of the primary call option at time t. Moreover,
τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ) is used to designate the time during the remaining contract life if a
primary option is exercised at time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ).
The following discusses the intrinsic value of exercising an option. Assuming
that a primary option is exercised at time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ), the option held by the
counterparty becomes the secondary option (which is the only option left for the
remaining contract life). The secondary option can be exercised at any time during
the remaining contract life, τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ). The intrinsic value of exercising the
secondary option is the payoff from adjusting the lease rate:
G(X(τ), τ) =

GSC(X(τ), τ) = A(T − τ, r)[F (X(τ), τ)− F (X(t), t)]
GSP (X(τ), τ) = A(T − τ, r)[F (F (X(t), t)−X(τ), τ)]
(4.4)
If one contractparty becomes the first to exercise her option by time t, the
payoff from exercising the primary option may be reduced if the secondary option
will be exercised later. This cost is not deterministic. Therefore, the primary option’s
holder uses the value of the secondary option as an estimated cost for exercising her
primary option. She subtracts this cost from the payoff of exercising the primary
option in the calculation of the intrinsic value:
G(X(t), t) =

GPC(X(t), t) = A(T − t, r)[F (X(t), t)− F (X(0), 0)]− V SP (X(t), t),
GPP (X(t), t) = A(T − t, r)[F (X(0), 0)− F (X(t), t)]− V SC(X(t), t).
(4.5)
The Value of the Option: All four of the options discussed here are American
options because their holders can exercise the price adjustment at any time during the
contract’s life. If immediately exercising the option is not optimal, the option holder
will wait for a better opportunity. Determination of the primary options’ value is
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challenging. This study approximates the value of the primary option with the non-
preemptive right with that with the preemptive right. Accordingly, the following
inequality must be satisfied:

V (X(t), t) ≥ max{G(X(t), t), 0}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, for primary options;
V (X(τ), τ) ≥ max{G(X(τ), τ), 0}, t ≤ τ ≤ T, for secondary options.
(4.6)
The inequality can be solved with an appropriate numerical method such as
the finite different method. For a more detaild discussion on solving theses equations
and valuing the options, please review the work written by [80].
Option Free Boundary: A call (or a put) option’s critical spot rate at any
time is either the smallest (or the greatest) spot rate at which the intrinsic value of
exercising the option equals the option’s value:
X˜(t) =

X˜PC(t) = min{X(t) : V PC(X(t), t) = GPC(X(t), t)},
X˜SC(t) = min{X(τ) : V SC(X(τ), τ) = GSC(X(τ), τ)},
X˜PP (t) = max{X(t) : V PP (X(t), t) = GPP (X(t), t)},
X˜SP (t) = max{X(τ) : V SP (X(τ), τ) = GSP (X(τ), τ)}.
(4.7)
The free boundary of an option is the trajectory of its critical spot rate on the
decision time horizon:
{X˜(t)|0 ≤ t ≤ T}, for primary options;
{X˜(τ)|t ≤ τ ≤ T}, for secondary options.
(4.8)
The relationship between the two free boundaries of primary options can be
determined, which is stated as the following Proposition.
Proposition I: X˜PC(t) > X˜PP (t) for 0 < t < T .
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Proposition I means that the free boundary of the primary call option is above that
of the primary put option.
Proof: For a primary option to be exercised, the payoff from exercising the op-
tion must be greater than zero. Therefore, F (X˜PC(t), t) > F (X(0), 0) > F (X˜PP (t), t)
for 0 < t < T as determained by Eqn. (4.5) and Eqn. (4.7). Moreover, at any time
before an option expires, X(t) > X ′(t) if F (X(t), t) > F (X ′(t), t) as determained by
Eqn. (4.3). Therefore, X˜PC(t) > X˜PP (t) for 0 < t < T . 
This study remarks that the free boundaries of the primary options are not
the true boundaries. They are approximation due to the fact that the values of the
primary options are approximation.
4.3.4. Pricing the DSPAF with the Non-Preemptive Right. Facili-
tated by the free boundaries of primary options, the Monte Carlo simulation (MCS)
method can be applied to estimate the value of DSPAF with the non-preemptive
right.
The following discusses Monte Carlo Simulation method. The state space is divided
into three zones: 1) “PCE”, 2) “PPE” and 3) “NE” - according to Proposition I. Any
random trajectory of the spot rate originated from the zone ‘NE”. If the trajectory
leaves the zone “NE”, either the primary call or the primary put option is exercised.
If the trajectory first enters the zone “PCE”, the option exercised is the primary call
option; otherwise it is the primary put option. Without loss of generality, Table 4.1
illustrates the pseudo code of the Monte Carlo simulation method for estimating the
DSPAF value for the lessor.
The following discusses boundaries of the flexibility value. The value of the
DSPAF with the non-preemptive right is bounded. These boundaries can be esti-
mated using the value of options with the preemptive right. The relationship between
the value of DSPAF with the non-preemptive right and that with the preemptive
right, Vpre, is summarized as the following Proposition:
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Table 4.1: Pseudo Code of the MSC for Estimating the DSPAF Value for the Lessor
0: Generate NMC samples of spot rate trajectory:
{X i(t)|0 ≤ t ≤ T} for i = 1, 2, . . . , NMC .
1: Determine the flexibility value for each sample path
for i = 1, 2, . . . , NMC
if ∃ X i(t) ≥ XPC(t) for 0 < t < T
tPCE ← min{t|X i(t) ≥ XPC(t)}
if ∃ X i(t) ≤ XPP (t) for 0 < t < T
tPPE ← min{t|X i(t) ≤ XPP (t)}
if tPCE < tPPE
V i ← exp(−rtPCE)GPC(X(tPCE), tPCE)
else
V i ← exp(−rtPPE)GPP (X(tPPE), tPPE)
end
else
V i ← exp(−rtPCE)GPC(X(tPCE), tPCE)
end
else
if ∃ X i(t) ≤ XPP (t) for 0 < t < T
tPPE ← min{t|X i(t) ≤ XPP (t)}
V i ← exp(−rtPPE)GPP (X(tPPE), tPPE)
else




2: Estimate the value of DSPAF with a non-preemptive right




Proposition II: V PCpre ≥ Vlessor ≥ −V PPpre , and V PPpre ≥ Vlessee ≥ −V PCpre .
For the lessor, the value of the DSPAF with the non-preemptive right, Vlessor, is
bounded from above by the value of the primary call option with the preemptive
right, V PCpre , and from below by the negative value of the primary put option with
the preemptive right, −V PPpre . For the lessee, the value of the DSPAF with the non-
preemptive right, Vlessee, is bounded from above by the value of the primary put
option with the preemptive right, V PPpre , and from below by the negative value of the
primary call option with the preemptive right, −V PCpre .
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Proof: The following lists contains five mutually exclusive scenarios of the
spot rate trajectory relative to the free boundaries of primary options:
I. The spot rate trajectory crosses the free boundary of the primary call option
before it crosses the free boundary of the primary put option.
II. The spot rate trajectory crosses only the free boundary of the primary call op-
tion.
III. The spot rate trajectory never crosses any free boundaries of primary options.
IV. The spot rate trajectory crosses only the free boundary of the primary put op-
tion.
V. The spot rate trajectory crosses the free boundary of the primary put option
before it crosses the free boundary of the primary put option.
In Table 4.2 the realized value (on any random sample of spot rate trajectory) of
DSPAF with the non-preemptive right is compared to those with the preemptive
right (held by the lessor and the lessee, respectively), for each scenario. On any
scenario i, the realized option value, Vi(X(t), t), is equal to either G(X˜(t), t) (if the
option is exercised at time t) or 0 (if the option expired). Again, without loss of
generality, the viewpoint of the lessor is used as an illustration.
Table 4.2: Realized Value of DSPAF for the Lessor: Non-Preemptive vs. Preemptive
Preemptive Right Non-preemptive Right Preemptive Right
Scenario (held by the lessor), (equally held by both), (held by the lessee),
V PCprei(X(t), t) Vlessori(X(t), t) −V PPprei(X(t), t)
I GPC(X˜PC(t), t) GPC(X˜PC(t), t) −GPP (X˜PP (t), t)
II GPC(X˜PC(t), t) GPC(X˜PC(t), t) 0
III 0 0 0
IV 0 −GPP (X˜PP (t), t) −GPP (X˜PP (t), t)
V GPC(X˜PC(t), t) −GPP (X˜PP (t), t) −GPP (X˜PP (t), t)
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Table 4.2 shows that
V PCprei(X(t), t) ≥ Vlessori(X(t), t) ≥ −V PPprei(X(t), t). (4.10)
That is, within each scenario the realized option value for the DSPAF with the non-
preemptive right is bounded from above by that with the preemptive right held by
the lessor and from below by the negative value of that with the preemptive right
held by the lessee. According to Eqn. (4.10, this is a sufficient condition for the
Proposition II.)
4.4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Consider a ship owner (i.e., the lessor) and a charterer (i.e., the lessee) working
in the maritime transportation TC market. Both expected dramatic movements in
the market price and wanted to protect against the market price risk. They agreed
on loading the TC contract with a DSPAF with the non-preemptive right to exercise
the adjustment. This clause gives the contract parties an equal right to adjust the
contracted TC rate to the prevailing rate once during the contract’s life.
The contract has a term of five years. The initial spot rate is equal to the
long-term steady rate, α∗, which equals 40×103 dollar/day. Other parameters of the
spot rate model are as follows: the spot rate volatility, σ, equals 3×103 dollar/day3/2;
the reverting speed of the spot rate, k, is 1 per year; the market price of risk, λ, is
equal to zero. a is equal to 1, (indicating that the price is quoted for the entire ship);
and b is equal to zero because the cash flows are net cash flows. The continuously
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compounded risk-free rate, r, is 5% per year (assumed fixed). The TC contract rate,
under these conditions, is 40×103 dollar/day, and the value of the 5-year TC contract
is $63.705× 106.
The values of the primary and the corresponding secondary options were de-
termined throughout this example using the FDM in [80]. The value of the primary
call option is $4.848× 106 and the primary put option value is $4.849× 106. Conse-
quently, the expected value of DSPAF with the non-preemptive right to adjust the
TC rate is within ±7.61% of the contract value. With the MCS method, the expected
value of the flexibility is found to be close to zero; that is, the cost for embedding the
DSPAF with the non-preemptive right is close to zero. It is remarked that the cost to
the lessor (or the lessee) will increase if the initial spot rate decreases (or increases),
departing away from the steady rate.
The following list contains five scenarios of TC rate adjustments when the
contract parties have the non-preemptive right to exercise the adjustment: 1) “the
primary call option exercised only”, 2) “both the primary call option and the sec-
ondary put option exercised”, 3) “the primary put option exercised only”, 4) “both
the primary put option and the secondary call option exercised”, 5) and “no option
exercised.” Figure 4.3 illustrates four examples with each representing one of the
four scenarios. The free boundaries of the primary call option and the primary put
option are displayed in Fig. 4.3 with the bold solid curve and the bold dash curve,
respectively. Random samples of the spot rate trajectory are in dash curve and TC
rates are in solid horizontal lines. Numerical results from the examples are further
summarized in Table 4.3.
Each free boundary divides the state space into the “holding the option” zone
and the “exercising the option” zone. The spot rate is always originated from the
“holding the option” zone. The price adjustment is exercised when the spot rate
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Figure 4.3: Illustrative Examples of TC Rate Adjustments
trajectory crosses the free boundary, transferring from “holding the option” zone to
“exercising the option” zone.
In scenario 1 (illustrated in Fig. 4.3(a)) the random sample path of the spot
rate rises up. The price becomes favorable for the lessor. The sample path crosses the
primary call option’s free boundary at time 2.222 years when the spot rate is equal
to 110.900 × 103 dollar/day. The call option (held by lessor) is then exercised and
the contracted TC rate is adjusted to the prevailing TC rate, F(110.900× 103,2.222),
equal to $64.474×103 dollar/day. This adjustment increases the lessor’s income cash
flows equivalent to $22.851 × 106 (assessed at the exercise time). At the exercise of
the primary call option, the put option held by the lessee becomes the secondary
option. The lessee is then allowed to re-adjust the rate, in case the price falls low
enough in her favor. The bold dotted curve demonstrates the secondary option’s
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free boundary. The spot rate random path, however, keeps rising and never crosses
the free boundary of the corresponding secondary put option. Consequently, the
lessee let her option expired. In this particular scenario the spot rate and TC rate
become highly favorable for the lessor. The net increase in the lessor’s income from
exercising flexibility is $20.449×106 (assessed at time zero). The flexibility increased
the contract value by 32.1% for the lessor, and increased the lessee’s leasing cost
by 32.1%. The lessee partially compensated the lessor. However, the lessee did not
pay more than the adjusted price for the rest of the contract term even when TC
prices kept rising after the first adjustment and considerably limited the risk of price
increase.
In scenario 2 (illustrated in Fig. 4.3(b)) the random path of the spot rate
also rises and crosses the free boundary of the primary call option at time 2.444
years.The primary call option is exercised at that point and the TC rate adjusted to
the prevailing rate, F(117.800 × 103,2.444), equal to $68.618 × 103 dollar/day. The
increased income cash flows to the lessor is equivalent to $24.717 × 106. The trend
of spot rate movement, in this scenario, reverses after the exercise of the primary
call option. The spot rate crosss the secondary put option’s free boundary at time
3.111 years. Secondary put option’ holder exercises her option to re-adjust the TC
rate to the more favorable prevailing TC rate $42.257 × 103 dollar/day. The option
exercise increases her income cash flows by $17.105× 103. The net gain or loss from
of flexibility in this case is 7.233 × 106, in favor of the lessor. The change in the
contract value is equivalent to 11.35% .
In scenario 3 (illustrated in Fig. 4.3(c)) the random path of spot rate falls
against the interest of the lessor and crosses the primary put option’s free boundary
at time 3.028 years when the spot rate is equal to −19.150×103 dollar/day (negative
rate is acceptable as the rate is modeled by the net ship income, TCE). The put
option is then exercised and the contracted TC rate is adjusted to the prevailing TC
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rate at this point, equal to $14.092 × 103 dollar/day. The adjustment reduces the
lessee’s cash outflows equivalent to $17.5167 × 106. The random path of the spot
rate keeps falling and never crosses the secondary call option’s free boundary. In this
scenario the market TC rates dramatically decreased against the lessor interest. The
net gain to the lessee was a sum of $17.517× 106, reducing the lessee’ leasing cost by
23.64%.
In scenario 4 (illustrated in Fig. 4.3(d)) the random path of the spot rate also
falls and crosses the free boundary of the primary put option at time 0.917 years
when the spot rate is $−46.060× 103. The primary put option is then exercised and
the TC rate is adjusted to a prevailing rate equal to $18.254 × 103 dollar/day. The
adjustment reduces the lessee’s cash outflows by $33.680 × 106. The trend of the
spot rate in this scenario reverses and rises up after the exercise of the primary put
option. The spot rate crosses the secondary call option’s free boundary at the time of
2.361 years when the spot rate is 50.040×103 dollar/day. The TC rate is re-adjusted
to $43.583 × 103 dollar/day. By exercising her option and re-adjusting the TC rate
back to a more favorable prevailing rate, the lessor increases her income cash flows by
$22.543× 106. This case is favorable for the lessee whose net gain from the flexibility
(discounted to time zero) is 12.138× 106, about a 19.05% saving in the leasing cost.
Figure 4.3 illustrates that the free boundaries of the two primary options meet
at the end of the contract period, which means that at least one contract party will
exercise the price adjustment.
4.5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This study not only models but also values a double-sided price adjustment
flexibility (DSPAF) of a non-preemptive right to exercise the adjustment within the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































real options provides a price flexibility for both contract parties at an equal level. This
non-preemptive right also allows both contract parties to take advantage of favorable
price changes, thus may adding value to the lease contract and making the long-term
contract a more fair contractual relationship. The price of the DSPAF with the non-
preemptive right depends heavily on the initial contract rate. The flexibility’s price
for any contract parties found to be less than that proposed by [80].
This non-preemptive right is expected to meet some participants flexibility
requirements and budgets. As a result it can better serves both parties in certain
market conditions, particularly, when the trend of future price movement in a volatile
market is difficult to predict. It also serves in cooperative situations where the lessee
and the lessor would like to have longer fair relationships.
The DSPAF with the non-preemptive right is also expected to complement
that with the preemptive right. It can do so by providing the lease parties with
another form of flexibility during the contracting process.
The work of this essay can be extended in multiple directions. A similar
model can be developed to manage the price risk in other types of contracts, such as
a long-term supply contracts on commodity and services. Another direction of future
work is to relax some model assumptions and examine the effect of the relaxation.
Other stochastic specifications of the spot price process such as the Geometric Mean
Reverting process may be more appropriate. Additionally, multiple risk factors may
be included in the model so that the price adjustment decision can comprehensively
consider different sources of uncertainty. For example, the stochasticity in the interest
rate. This work also builds the foundation for modeling multiple-exercisable price




This dissertation research utilized the real options theory to exploit an alter-
native approach to managing the price risk for long-term lease contracts in volatile
markets. It proposed to embed the price adjustment flexibility to long-term lease
contracts. The proposed flexibility allows contract parties to adjust the contracted
lease rate when it is far from the prevailing rate. The work modeled the flexibility as
real options, quantified the price of the flexibility (i.e., the expected value of the flex-
ibility), and tested the proposed approach with examples of Time Charter contracts
from the maritime transport industry.
Three forms of price adjustment flexibility that can be embedded in the long-
term lease contracts were developed. The first form of developed flexibility is the
single-sided price adjustment flexibility (SSPAF) in the form of an American call
option to the lessor and an American put option to the lessee. In this form of flexibility
only one contract party is allowed to adjust the contract rate to the prevailing rate.
The second form of developed flexibility is a double-sided price adjustment
flexibility (DSPAF) with the preemptive right to exercise. That is, both contract par-
ties are allowed to adjust the lease rate to take advantage of favorable price changes,
yet at different levels. One party can enjoy superior level of flexibility over the coun-
terparty through purchasing the preemptive right to adjust the price.
The third form of developed flexibility is the DSPAF with the non-preemptive
right to exercise the price adjustment. That is, both contract parties have equal,




Insightful findings from the research build our knowledge and experience with
the practice of price adjustment flexibility. Particularly,
• This work shows that price adjustment flexibility can be provided to both con-
tract parties when they want it. However, a DSPAF is not a linear combination
of the lessor SSPAF and the lessees SSPAF. Additionally, the DSPAF with
the non-preemptive right is not a linear combination of the DSPAF with the
preemptive right belonging to the lessor and that belongs to the lessee.
• The price adjustment flexibility is a value added in that it allows contract parties
to take advantages of favorable market conditions. The price of the flexibility
can be quantified with the Real Options (ROs) valuation. The flexibility’s price
is dependent on multiple factors, including the lease rate dynamics, contract
term, and constraints on the flexibility.
• Each form of the price adjustment flexibility meets specific purpose of risk man-
agement and budget requirement, and is suitable for specific market condition.
Thus, it is important to have a variety of flexibility options in the negotiation
of flexibility clauses for long-term contracts.
• A straightforward tool for implementing the price adjustment flexibility is the
trajectory of critical spot rate, termed the free boundary for exercising the price
adjustment. At any time the boundary determines whether the adjustment
should be made by comparing the realized market rate to the critical rate. When
both contract parties have the price adjustment flexibility, the free boundary of
the secondary option is not fixed. It depends on the time the primary option
was exercised and the spot rate at the option exercise.
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5.3. CONTRIBUTIONS
This research advances our knowledge on modeling and valuation of flexibility,
real options, and risk management. Particularly,
• This work develops a ROs methodology for managing the price risk with flexibil-
ity, which complements the risk management capability of fixed rate long-term
lease contracts. With the price adjustment flexibility, participants of long-term
contracts can take advantages of favorable price movement. This helps maintain
a good long-term relationship between contract parties.
• This work proposes to embed the price adjustment flexibility in long-term fixed
rate lease contracts, which provides an alternative tool of price risk management
to participants in a more natural way. It is a tool more accessible to participants
than derivatives. Market participants can directly use the tool for contracting
and risk management without going to the hassle of financial derivatives. Be-
cause financial depravities are more complex and require special knowledge and
experiences with derivatives and inheres certain limitations. The model can be
easily set up as a simple, user-friendly tool with GUI (e.g., a web based tool).
The price adjustment flexibility becomes even more important in lease markets
where derivatives are not available.
• This work contributes to the ROs literature by pushing the boundary of real
options applications to further spaces. ROs are not about simply applying
the financial derivative theories and methods to non-financial domains. Great
efforts of ROs methods lie in a “domain translation” in that ROs translate the
basic options pricing theories into insightful decision methods. The valuation
and modeling methodology developed in this work enrich ROs theories and
applications.
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• This work builds a solid mathematical foundation for designing and imple-
menting other forms of flexibility, such as multiple-sided multiple-exercisable
flexibility, for general contract relationships.
5.4. FUTURE RESEARCH
The completion of this dissertation is not the end, rather, the starting point
of inspired future exploration. The dissertation work initiates the discussion of a
series of topics that are interesting to both industrial practitioners and academic
researchers. A few thoughts of the future research are the following:
• Broader Applications: This dissertation serves as a good starting point of mod-
eling various price flexibilities needed in different market environments. For
instance, a similar model can be developed to manage price risk for other types
of contracts such as long-term procurement and supply contracts on commodity
and services.
• Model Generalization: The developed models of price adjustment flexibility
can be extended in a number of directions that call for further studies. One
important direction of future studies is to model other attractive forms of flex-
ibility. For example, the double-sided, multiple-exercisable flexibility with the
preemptive right, where both contract parties have an equal, parallel price ad-
justment flexibility that can be exercised more than once during the contract
life. Multiple-sided, multiple-exercisable price adjustment flexibility is another
important flexibility design worth of studying.
• Quality Improvement of Stochastic Models: Another direction of future work is
to relax some model assumptions and examine the effect of the relaxation. The
stochastic model of the underlying variable plays a critical role in dynamic de-
cision. The quality of the stochastic model directly impacts the effectiveness of
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the decision outcomes. Other stochastic specifications of the spot price process
may be more appropriate such as the Geometric Mean Reverting process and
worth testing. Moreover, multiple risk factors may be included in the model
so that the price adjustment decision can comprehensively consider different
sources of uncertainty, for example the stochasticity in the interest rate.
These extensions would provide a richer picture of both the design and pricing




Table A.1: List of Nomenclature
Term Unit Definition
α [dollar/day] the long term rate of X(t)
α∗ [dollar/day] α under the equivalent Martingale measure (*)
γ parameters of finite difference methods
λ [day−1/2] the market price of risk
σ [dollar/day3/2] the volatility of X(t)
∆X [dollar/day] the step size of spot freight rate on the grid (ti, Xj)
∆t [day] the step size of time on the grid (ti, Xj)
A(t, r) [day] annuity value factor
B(t, r, k) [dollar] a term of cash for determining contract values
C(X(t), t) [dollar] the call option value at time t
Eˆt the risk-neural expected value assessed at time t
F (X(t), t) [dollar/day] the TC rate realized at time t and effective until T
G(X(t), t) [dollar] the intrinsic value of exercising option at time t
K(t) [dollar] the adjustment cost
M the number of steps of spot rate on the grid (ti, Xj)
N the number of time steps on the grid (ti, Xj)
P (X(t), t) [dollar] the put option value at time t
T [day] the term of contract
V (X(t), t) [dollar] the (general) option value at time t
X(t) [dollar/day] the spot freight rate at time t
Xj [dollar/day] the (discrete )spot freight rate
Z(t) [day1/2] standard Wiener process
Z∗(t) [day1/2] Z(t) under the equivalent Martingale measure (*)
a the size of cargo
b [dollar/day] the cost flow rate
h the proportional factor for determining K(t)
i the index of (discrete) time on the grid (ti, Xj)
j the index of (discrete) spot rate on the grid (ti, Xj)
k [year−1] the reverting speed of spot rate
r [year−1] the risk-free rate
t [day] (continuous) time
ti [day] (discrete) time
tL [day] lock-up period
Terms showing no unit are dimensionless.
APPENDIX B
THE CALIBRATION OF OU PROCESS MODEL
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According to Eqn. (2.1), the OU mean-reverting process followed by the spot
rate, X(t), is





where  follows the standard normal distribution. We rewrite Eqn. (B.1) as a regres-
sion function,
X(t+ dt) = c1 + c2X(t) + et, (B.2)
where
c1 = α(1− e−kdt), (B.3)
c2 = e
−kdt, (B.4)







Given a time series data of X(t), the regression model in Eqn. (B.2) can be
fitted. Let cˆ1, cˆ2, and σˆe denote the estimated values for c1, c2, and σe, respectively,
obtained from the regression analysis. The estimates of parameters k, α, and σ are
kˆ = − ln(cˆ2)/dt, (B.6)
αˆ = cˆ1/(1− cˆ2), (B.7)
σˆ = σˆe
√−2 ln (cˆ2)/[dt(1− cˆ22)]. (B.8)
Other techniques can also be used to calibrate the model parameters, for
example the Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
APPENDIX C
PSEUDO CODE OF THE OPTION VALUATION ALGORITHM
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The pseudo code of the algorithm for valuing the options are shown in Table
C.1. Inputs of the valuation include:
• parameters for setting up the 2D grid, (ti, Xj): Xmax, Xmin, ∆X, T , and ∆T ;
• parameters of the spot rate model: X(0), α, λ, k, and σ;
• contract design parameters: h, and tL; and
• parameters of contract valuation model: a, b, and r.
Table C.1: Pseudo Code of the Algorithm for Valuing the Options
0. Build a 2D grid of size N ×M :
N ← T/∆t,
M ← (Xmax −Xmin)/∆X.
1. Define the terminal condition: Vi,j ← 0 for i = N and any j.
2. Value the option backward:
for i = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0
Determine the expected value of continuation, Vi,j :
for boundary points (j = 0,M), use the explicit method in Eqns. (2.18-2.21);
for interior points (j = 1, . . . ,M − 1), use the implicit method in Eqns.
(2.22-2.23).
Determine the intrinsic value of option exercise, Gi,j , if i∆t > tL:
if Vi,j = C(Xmin + j∆X, i∆t)
Gi,j ← A(T − i∆t, r)[F (i∆t, T )− (1 + h)F (X(0), 0)],
else
Gi,j ← A(T − i∆t, r)[(1− h)F (X(0), 0)− F (i∆t, T )].
end;
Vi,j ← max{Gi,j , Vi,j}.
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